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INTRODUCTION
The board of directors is created by the state through its
corporation statute and serves as a reminder of the public na-
ture of the corporation. The bylaws or certificate of incorpora-
tion typically set the number of directors to be elected by the
shareholders and the length of their terms (traditionally one
year, but today many corporations have staggered boards).
The board acts at meetings, typically by majority vote, and it
can establish committees to act on its behalf. As a general mat-
ter, a corporation is to be managed by or under the direction
of its board of directors.' Yet the scope of the board's role and
duties, as well as the standard of liability by which its actions
are evaluated, have remained unsettled throughout the twenti-
eth century.
Literature discussing the board's role, duties, and liabili-
ties is vast but, for the most part, limited to empirical studies,
normative discussions, and policy arguments. My goal in this
article is different. Rather than approaching the subject from
an empirical, normative, or policymaking angle, I seek to add
an important historical dimension to these analyses. This arti-
cle examines scholarly conversations and judicial decisions,
ranging from the turn of the twentieth century to its end,
about the appropriate status of directors and the standard of
liability that each status carried-specifically in situations in-
volving allegations of breaches of the duty of care. 2 I argue
that during the course of the twentieth century, jurists moved
1. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Act §8.01(b) (2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (2001). For a detailed analysis of the development of the corporate
board, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corpo-
rate Board of Directors, 33 HoFsTRA L. REv. 89 (2004).
2. While little is left today of the director's duty of care (see infra Part
IV), and while throughout the twentieth century very few cases held direc-
tors liable for breaching the duty of care, it is in relation to this duty that
discussions of the directors' status and liabilities were most pertinent. I
therefore focus on scholarly andjudicial assessments of the duty of care. For
an intriguing historical analysis of the transformation of the duty of loyalty,
broadly defined, in New York, see William E. Nelson, The Law of Fiduciary
Duty in New York, 1920-1980, 53 SMU L. REV. 285 (2000).
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from viewing directors as trustees, to describing directors as
representatives of the shareholders, to holding that directors
were mere agents of shareholders who typically served as
rather passive principals. Each of these labels implied a partic-
ular standard of liability-trustees were subjected to height-
ened requirements, directors as representatives were expected
to act reasonably, while agents' decisions were subjected only
to minimal scrutiny. As I further argue, academic and judicial
definitions of the appropriate legal status of directors (and the
corresponding liabilities) were influenced by different under-
standings of the role of corporations in society. The early-twen-
tieth century idea that directors were trustees was influenced
by the Progressives' concerns about the concentration of pri-
vate and public power, the mid century notion that directors
were representatives of the shareholders was informed by the
ideals of democracy, while the late twentieth century descrip-
tion of directors as agents was influenced by market ideology.3
In the end, however, each assigned status helped legitimate
directors' (and executives') power and limited, if any, liability.
The idea that directors were trustees helped legitimate the
powerful public corporation, the notion that directors were
representatives was used by the courts to justify their deference
to directors' discretion, while the vision of directors as agents
helped shield directors and executives from liability alto-
gether.
3. I focus on scholarly and judicial discussions rather than on corporate
statutes because, for the most part, important changes and developments
were judge-made while the statutes attempted to codify them. See, e.g., Ken-
neth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1291,
1316 (1952) (noting that "as a practical matter it may be fruitless to attempt
direct legislation with respect to most aspects of the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors and majority shareholders to manage the corporation with care, dili-
gence and loyalty, and this perhaps explains the general lack of legislation in
the field"); William L. Cary and Sam Harris, Standards of Conduct under Com-
mon Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAw. 61, 64 (1972)
(noting that "very generally almost all of the statutes in this area ... [say]
that directors shall discharge their duties with that degree of care which or-
dinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like po-
sitions"); E. Norman Veasey and William E. Manning, Codified Standard Safe
Harbor or Uncharted Reef?. An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared
with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAw. 919, 923 (1980) (noting that statutes do not
typically state what the role of the board is other than in very general terms).
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The first part of this article sets the stage for my analysis of
the twentieth century evolution of directors' status and liability
by describing the emergence of the board of directors as an
important institution with the development of the modern
public corporation in the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. I begin by discussing courts' bifurcated analyses of direc-
torial duties and liabilities that took place, almost literally,
minutes before the rise of the giant modern public corpora-
tion. As I argue, some late nineteenth century jurists insisted
that corporations were aggregations of individuals and direc-
tors were their agents. In the absence of a conflict of interest,
fraud, or bad faith, directors, as agents, were liable to the cor-
poration and its shareholders only when their actions were
grossly negligent. In contrast, otherjurists viewed corporations
as real entities, existing separately and apart from their mem-
bers, and capable of exercising power that resembled the
power of the sovereign state. They proclaimed that directors
were trustees for the community and examined their actions
under an ordinary negligence standard. 4
With the emergence of the giant public corporation dur-
ing and after the merger wave of the late 1890s, discussions of
the status of the board became situated in a broader public
concern about corporate power and its potential abuse. As the
second part of this article elaborates, scholarly focus centered
upon the power that the control group (typically controlling
shareholders) could exercise to manipulate stock prices and
market transactions. Legal scholars, seeking to legitimate the
large public corporation and its power while eliminating such
abuses by the control group, turned their focus on directors;
they wanted to vest directors with public power and public
trust. The real entity vision of the corporation, coupled with
the description of directors as trustees for the community, pre-
vailed. Both ideas were grounded in the recognition that cor-
porations and other associations were powerful, perhaps even
sovereign, entities. The success of American democracy thus
4. While these jurists' claim that directors were trustees for the commu-
nity anticipated late twentieth century discussions of directors' duties toward
different corporate constituencies, the jurists' discussions did not focus on
particular stakeholders; rather, they argued that corporate power should be
exercised to benefit all those affected by it.
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demanded recognition of their autonomy as well as limitations
on their power.
By the early 1930s, the vision of the corporate director as
trustee seemed to dominate legal discourse, but the victory was
short-lived. As the third part of this article demonstrates, after
the programs of the New Deal were put in place and the Great
Depression wore down, concerns about .corporate power dissi-
pated. Discussions about the duties and liabilities of corporate
directors became intertwined with a vision of corporate de-
mocracy that rested on the assumption that individual share-
holders had to be protected from corporate management. 5 In
reform literature beginning in the mid 1930s (and through
the 1970s) and in the courts, directors were described as the
shareholders' representatives and guardians against manage-
rial abuses of power. 6 Such an understanding of the director's
role seemed to correlate with a lower standard of liability for
breaches of the duty of care. Just as shareholders began more
aggressively to use the derivative suit to voice their objections
to certain corporate decisions and actions, the courts (specifi-
cally New York courts) restated the business judgment rule,
traditionally a rule recognizing human fallibility, as a rule of
absolute deference to experts. As such, it rapidly became a
means of restraining shareholders' ability to tame corporate
directors and managers, even if the actions of the latter
harmed the corporation. 7 The rhetoric of democracy and rep-
resentation became increasingly apologetic.
Beginning in the 1960s, the focal point for analysis shifted
to the market. As the fourth part of this article explains, main-
stream legal scholars and economists came to believe that the
market was the most effective institution to constrain corpo-
rate (and political) activities. In addition to the fears of corpo-
5. Unless otherwise stated, the term management in this article refers to
the corporation's top executives.
6. The period from the 1930s through the 1970s is typically referred to
as the managerial period due to the fact that, for different reasons, manage-
ment dominated the composition of boards and non-management directors
played a minimal role, if any, in the corporations on whose boards they
served. The idea that directors were representatives of the shareholders pre-
vailed during this period.
7. While it might be surprising, the development of the business judg-
ment rule a's we know it today took place only in the last decades of the
twentieth century. See discussion infra Sections III.C and IV.D.
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rate power, which faded after influencing the debates in the
early twentieth century, the concerns about corporate hierar-
chies that dominated the mid century discussions disappeared.
Just as insider professional management became more power-
ful and the board of directors became ever less involved in
managing the affairs of the corporation,8 scholars returned to
the rhetoric of the laws of contracts and agency to describe
directors as the (private) agents of the shareholders. This
description worked in tandem with a particular model of the
board that emerged in the 1970s-the monitoring board,
composed of a majority of independent or outside directors.9
The presence of independent directors substantiated the
description of directors as the shareholders' agents, while the
insiders were left to act almost with no constraints or liabilities.
The Delaware courts, which by the last decades of the
twentieth century had become the authoritative voice of U.S.
corporate law, endorsed the portrayal of directors as agents
(albeit with modifications) and of the board's role as monitor-
ing. As if to complement the limited status and role they as-
signed to the board, the Delaware courts also collapsed the
duty of care into the business judgment rule and restated the
rule, proclaiming that it altered the standard of care applica-
ble to directors' actions from negligence to gross negligence.
The rule that originated in the recognition of human imper-
fections, and later became a rule of deference to experts, was
transformed into a shield against liability. If there was ever a
possibility of imposing liability on directors for breaches of
8. See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors:
Fond Hope-Faint Promise? 76 MICH. L. REv. 581, 581 (1978) (noting that"management has minimized the board's participation in corporate govern-
ance, and the board of directors has been reduced to an 'impotent ceremo-
nial and legal fiction."').
9. The monitoring board's tasks were limited. It was to select, oversee,
and, when necessary, fire the corporation's CEO, to ensure "the general in-
tegrity of the operation," and to make certain fundamental decisions. See
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, in THE NEW CORPORATE GOv-
ERNANCE, Troy A. Paredes, ed. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 26-27, available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract-id=801308) (describing the
emergence of the monitoring board). See alsoJeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and
Stock Market Prices, 59 STAr. L. REv. 1465 (2007) (describing the correlation
between the rise of independent directors, whose role is to monitor manage-
ment, and the maximization of shareholder value).
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their duty of care, that possibility was almost nonexistent by
the end of the 1980s. As the epilogue concludes, directors' lia-
bility at the turn of the twenty-first century seems to be, if any-
thing, an ideal with no practical effect.
I.
SETrING THE STAGE: THE BOARD OF DIRECToRs
AT CENTURY'S END
A. Changing Roles
Boards of directors have been part of the corporate struc-
ture at least for several centuries. Early charters, such as the
1791 Charter of the Bank of the United States, provided for
boards of directors to be elected by the shareholders. In 1811,
New York enacted the first American general incorporation
statute, providing that "the stock, property and concerns of
such company shall be managed and conducted by trustees,
who, except those for the first year, shall be elected at such
time and place as shall be directed by the by laws of the said
company." 10 But, while the board existed, it was not consid-
ered to be a significant body in the early nineteenth century
and it received little, if any, attention from jurists.
This token attention fit the minimal role directors were
expected to play in their corporations. Typically, those who
owned all or a majority of a corporation's stock managed the
corporation. Directors, if different from the owners, served
"for the prestige associated with the position."' Directors were
expected to exercise due care and diligence in managing the
affairs of the corporation (although the required standard of
care was continuously debated).1 2 But, for the most part, the
role of the board was symbolic; directors were typically de-
scribed as "gratuitous mandatories." As some historians sug-
10. Gevurtz, supra note 1, at 108. See also Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory
Requirement of A Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV.
696, 703 (1960) ("It must be conceded that boards of directors, or 'assist-
ants' and 'committeemen' as they were originally called, have long existed as
part of the structure of corporations.").
11. StephenJ. Lubben & AlanaJ. Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL.
J. CoRP. L. 589, 595 (2006).
12. Marcia M. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the
Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REiv. 605, 606-07
(1987).
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gest, the board was, perhaps, a reflection of the republican na-
ture of American political institutions. 13
Indeed, while the directors' role might have been sym-
bolic, the appropriate allocation of power between directors
and executives was a contested issue. State charters of incorpo-
ration attempted to devise internal governance structures that"mirrored republican institutions so as to prevent the rise of
overpowering corporate executive authority."'1 4 Seeking to
"blur the distinction between the board of directors elected by
the stockholders, and the highest executive officials (or man-
agers)" these state charters often required the board to ap-
point one of the directors as the corporation's president. 15
By mid nineteenth century, attempts to control corporate
internal structures proved to be inefficient as conflicts be-
tween "technical and financial managers" became abundant
(especially in the railroad industry). Those who had the finan-
cial means to be elected to boards were typically unfamiliar
with the management of the business or had little time to en-
gage in it. Legislatively imposed checks and balances rapidly
disappeared; as one historian put it, "paramount executive au-
thority had emerged despite organizational restrictions. 1 6
Interestingly, it was in this context thatjurists turned their
attention to the board of directors. Take, for example, the key
corporate law treatises of the nineteenth century. In 1831, Jo-
seph Angell and Samuel Ames saw no need to address the
board of directors in their famous Treatise on the Law of Private
Corporations Aggregate. Almost fifty years later, in 1880, Judge
Seymour Thompson devoted two of six chapters in his treatise,
13. On the republican origin of the modern corporation, see Pauline
Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. AND MARY
Q. 51 (1993); Liam S. O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 201 (2006). It is also im-
portant to remember that with the exception of railroads and banks, the
shares of which were publicly traded, "the nineteenth century was a time of
control through restrictive charters and detailed statutes dealing with corpo-
rate and board powers in the context of a population of overwhelmingly
closely-held corporations." Lawrence E. Mitchell, Introduction, CORPoRATE
GOVERNANCE (Ashgate, forthcoming 2008).
14. James A. Ward, Power and Accountability on the Pennsylvania Railroad,
1846-1878, 49 Bus. HIST. REv. 37, 38 (1975).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 58. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
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The Liability of Directors and Other Officers and Agents of the Corpo-
ration, to the liability of directors. 17
This interest in the directors' role reached beyond aca-
demic literature. Amidst unfolding corporate scandals and
growing concerns about corporations' liabilities for their work-
ers, consumers, and capital providers, public opinion raised
significant questions about the role of the board, including:
[W] hether the directors of a modern business corpo-
ration do in any proper sense direct, whether and
how far the directors are personally liable when the
affairs of the corporation are grossly mismanaged,
and what duties if any, the directors owe to the pub-
lic, to the stockholders, and to the creditors of the
corporation. 18
The first publicly held corporations in the United States
were banks and insurance companies (and later, railroads),
hence the first judicial analyses of these questions involved fi-
nancial institutions. 19 As the following section explains, while
it was settled that directors owed a duty of care to their corpo-
rations, the standard by which their actions were judged was
widely debated. At least in part, courts' definitions of directors'
standard of liability reflected their understanding of the ap-
propriate relationship between the different corporate constit-
uencies, specifically, the relationship between directors and of-
ficers.
17. JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE (1831); SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, THE LIABIL-
ITY OF DIRECrORS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF CORPORATIONS
(1880). See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY, 98-100 (1992) (describ-
ing this transformation).
18. Charles F. Beach, Jr., The Functions and Accountability of Railway Direc-
tors, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 3, 1891, at 4, available at APS Online.
19. See similarly Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the
Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 973-74 (1994) ("In
this country, by the nineteenth century, the concept that corporate directors
owed a common law fiduciary duty of care to their institutions was recog-
nized but was generally confined to the directors of banks and financial insti-
tutions.").
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B. Allocating Liability
Some cases were relatively easy. All courts held directorsliable in cases involving fraud or bad faith, intentional viola-
tions of positive law, or complete passivity in the face of sus-pected improper conduct by officers. In a similar manner, di-
rectors were exempt from liability for honest mistakes, alsoknown as mistakes that even a prudent person might make.
(Such an exemption existed throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury and, as I will elaborate in the third part of this article,
became the foundation for the modern business judgmentrule.20 ) Jurisdictions (and courts) differed, however, in assess-
ing situations in which the directors, due to other demands ontheir time (including active roles in their own businesses),
were simply inattentive, and situations in which the directors,
after exercising judgment in selecting employees, did notmonitor their actions. As one writer summarized the courts'positions on the matter: "If a director is guilty of fraud, or ofviolating a statute, or of executing his authority, he is clearlyliable. Beyond this he may be liable for something more, butprecisely what cannot be told until the matter comes before
the court for determination. 21
Take, for example, Spering's Appeal, a case that involved an
action by the assignee of the National Safety Insurance and
20. Perhaps the earliest articulation of this exemption was found in Percy& Al. v. Millaudon & A., 8 MART. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) ("[T] he adop-
tion of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the [director] responsi-ble, if the error was one into which a prudent man might have fallen....The test of responsibility therefore, should be, not the certainty of wisdom inothers, but the possession of ordinary knowledge and by showing that theerror of the [director] is of so gross a kind that a man of common sense, andordinary attention, would not have fallen into it."). See also Godbold v.Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 ALA. 191, 199 (1847) (explaining that directors
do not "undertake that they possess such a perfect knowledge of the mattersand subjects which may come under their cognizance, that they can not err,or [sic] mistaken, either in the wisdom or legality of the means employed bythem"); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853) ("[A] Boardof Directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence,who nevertheless fall into a mistake, either as to law or fact, are not liable forthe consequences of such mistake"); S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 93, 99-100 (1980) (arguing that "the princi-
pal genesis of the business judgment rule" was "human fallibility.").
21. Albert S. Bolles, The Duty and Liability of Bank Directors, 12 YALE L.J.
287, 299 (1903).
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Trust Company against its directors for, among other things,
improper management of its affairs as evidenced by impru-
dent investment decisions that left the company bankrupt. In-
formed by the early-nineteenth century tradition of labeling
directors "gratuitous mandatories," the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania described the company's directors as "persons
who have gratuitously undertaken to perform certain duties,
and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and dili-
gence, but no more." 22 Noting that directors were typically
shareholders, the court concluded: "it is evident that gentle-
men elected by the stockholders from their own body ought
not to be judged by the same strict standard as the agent or
trustee of a private estate. Were such a rule applied, no gentle-
men of character and responsibility would be found willing to
accept such places." 23 Hence, the court held that the directors
were not liable "for mistakes of judgment, even though they
may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, pro-
vided they are honest and provided they are fairly within the
scope of the powers and discretion confided to the manage-
ment body."24 In short, according to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in exercising their powers, directors were only
required to avoid gross negligence. 25
The Court of Appeals of New York adopted a different
approach less than a decade later. In Hun v. Cary, an action by
the receiver of the Central Savings Bank of the City of New
York against the bank's trustees for making bad investment de-
cisions, the court held the directors to a higher degree of care,
that is, "the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise in conducting personal business affairs." 26
Judge Earl stressed that the standard was "not the highest de-
gree, not such as a very vigilant or extremely careful person
would exercise" because, as he reasoned, "if such were re-
quired, it would be difficult to find trustees who would incur
the responsibility of such trust positions."27 Yet he also found
the lowest degree of care inappropriate. "Few persons would
be willing to deposit money in savings banks, or to take stock
22. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 17, 21 (1872).
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id. at 24.
25. See McMurray, supra note 12, at 607 & n.ll.
26. Id. at 607 & n.13
27. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 70-71 (1880).
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in corporations," Earl reasoned, "with the understanding that
the trustees or directors were bound only to exercise slight
care, such as inattentive persons would give to their own busi-
ness, in the management of the large and important interests
committed to their hands." 28 Finding a mean between the
highest degree of care and the lowest one, Judge Earl con-
cluded that "when one deposits money in savings bank, or
takes stock in a corporation... he expects, and has a right to
expect, that the trustees or directors, who are chosen to takehis place in the management and control of his property, will
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the trusts committed
to them-the same degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own af-
fairs."29
While the holdings in these cases and others turned ulti-
mately on their facts, the conceptual differences between the
Pennsylvania and New York approaches were significant. Judge
Sharswood, who wrote the decision in Spering's Appeal, was al-
most exclusively concerned about imposing too demanding a
standard of liability on directors lest no gentleman would ac-
cept their position.30 In comparison, Judge Earl, who wrote
the decision in Hun, focused on the appearance of public
duty, treating directors as public officials. Accordingly, a direc-tor "who undertakes to act for another in a situation or em-
ployment requiring skill and knowledge" must discharge his
duties with ordinary care; "and it matters not that the service is
to be rendered gratuitously."'
In other words, the Pennsylvania courts viewed the ques-
tion within the narrow lens of corporate law, a matter involv-
ing no one but private parties. Accordingly, the issue was the
28. Id. at 71.
29. Id.
30. See similarly Bolles, supra note 71, at 289-90 (" [The] minimum liability
rule regards the matter from the director's side. He is indeed required to
exercise a general supervision, and fulfill a few specific statutory require-
ments, but not much more. It is not expected that he will devote much time
to the affairs of the bank, as he is rarely paid anything for his service, and
generally is engaged in other and far more important business. It is not rea-
sonable to expect that he will examine the books and other records, and
without doing these things he cannot know much about the details of the
bank's affairs; and this is supposed to be known by all who do business with
banking institutions.").
31. Hun, 82 N.Y. at 74.
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allocation of liability and blame as between directors and exec-
utives with a nod to the fact that shareholders elected their
directors. For the New York courts, the matter reached beyond
the private parties involved to pressing questions of govern-
ance in modern industrialized society. While the Pennsylvania
courts legitimated the status quo, that is, the expanding power
of executive officers and the diminishing role of directors, the
New York courts, fearing potential abuses of executive power,
insisted on finding a role for the board.
The U.S. Supreme Court was similarly conflicted. In 1891,
in Briggs v. Spaulding, the Court assessed an action by a share-
holder against the directors of a bank for losses incurred as a
result of the unsupervised activities of the bank's president.
One member of the board of directors was "an elderly man of
great experience in banking, [who] regarded himself as
merely an adviser, [and who] remained upon his farm at a dis-
tance during the time of wrong-going and did not go near the
bank, relying wholly upon the new President's statement that
everything was going well." Another director was "crippled
with rheumatism" and "unable to attend to the bank's affairs,"
while a third director "had illness in his family and remained
away" during the period of wrongdoing.3 2
Writing for five justices, Chief Justice Fuller emphasized
that the degree of care required of directors is "that which or-
dinarily prudent and diligent men would exercise under simi-
lar circumstances." 33 But, he added, "what may be negligence
in one case may not be want of ordinary care in another, and
the question of negligence is, therefore, ultimately a question
of fact, to be determined under all the circumstances. ''34 In
this particular case, and despite the apparent neglect by the
directors, the majority held that the directors were not liable.
As Fuller put it, given the structure of the public corporation,
directors could rely on their corporation's agents to manage
the corporation as long as they were not grossly negligent in
doing so.35
32. Frederick Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17 YALE L.J. 33, 37-38
(1907).
33. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 147-48.
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Justice Harlan, joined by three other justices, wrote a
harsh dissent. He thought it implausible to assume that direc-
tors of a national bank, entrusted with managing the bank "dil-
igently and honestly," could "abdicate their functions and
leave its management and the administration of its affairs en-
tirely to executive officers. ' 36 Harlan agreed that the directors
could authorize officers or agents to act "in respect to matters
of current business and detail that may be properly entrusted
to them by the directors."3 7 But, as he pointedly put it:
[C]ertainly, Congress never contemplated that the
duty of directors to manage and to administer the af-
fairs of a national bank should be in abeyance alto-
gether during any period that particular officers and
agents of the association are authorized or permitted
by the directors to have full control of its affairs. If
the directors of a national bank choose to invest its
officers or agents with such control, what the latter
do may bind the bank as between it and those deal-
ing with such officers and agents. But the duty re-
mains, as between the directors and those who are
interested in the bank, to exercise proper diligence
and supervision in respect to what may be done by its
officers and agents. 3 8
Harlan stressed that the appropriate standard demanded
that the directors exercise "diligence and supervision as the
situation and the nature of the business requires... they must
do all that reasonably prudent and careful men ought to do
for the protection of the interests of others entrusted to their
charge."3 9
When compared word-for-word, the differences between
the standards articulated by the Briggs majority and dissent
seem almost insignificant. Like the New York and Pennsylvania
cases, the conflicting rulings reflected, in part, the justices' at-tempts to grasp the changing role of the board of directors in
light of the structural changes occurring in American corpora-
tions. Yet, as I argue in the following section, debates about
36. Id. at 169 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. Harlan's mention of Congress is in reference to the National
Bank Act.
39. Id. at 170.
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the standard of negligence applicable to corporate directors
had perhaps less to do with corporate law per se than with the
unsettled state of the law of negligence. In this vein, debates
about the appropriate role of the board of directors reflected
the jurisprudential crisis of the late nineteenth century.
C. Negligence
The question whether there were different "degrees of
negligence" was widely debated in the late nineteenth century.
In 1703, British Chief Justice Holt had classified negligence
into three categories: gross, ordinary, and slight. Beginning in
the mid nineteenth century, however, with the emergence of
classical jurisprudence and the advance of the scientific
method, legal writers became concerned that such categories
could undermine law's (proclaimed) objectivity. A conception
of slight negligence raised concerns about imposing strict lia-
bility on certain actors (particularly the railroads). In turn, the
concept of gross negligence was seen as a means of giving too
much discretion to juries who could engage in "moralistic and
subjective" assessments of the behavior in question. As Morton
Horwitz explains:
[T]he three-tier conception of negligence and the
doctrine of punitive damages cut against the efforts
of late-nineteenth-century legal thinkers to develop a
clear boundary between an apolitical, anti-redistribu-
tive private law and an inherently unstable, political
public law. If the functions of tort and criminal or
regulatory law were overlapping-if the tort law
could legitimately move beyond the realm of correc-
tive justice into that of punishment for immoral be-
havior-the idea of an apolitical private law whose
sole function was to vindicate private rights was
threatened.40
Seeking to eliminate moralism and subjective standards
from the science of law, and promote instead "order, uniform-
ity, certainty, and predictability," liberal legal thinkers argued
40. HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 115. Concerns about imposing strict liabil-
ity on railroads stemmed from broader concerns about encouraging risk-
taking, which by the late nineteenth century was seen as a prerequisite for
economic development. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).
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that in fact there was only one standard for determining negli-
gence, that of the "ordinary and prudent man."4 1
Similar concerns underlay the courts' assessments of di-rectors' duties and liabilities. For example, ChiefJustice Fuller
began his analysis in Briggs by stressing that judicial opinionwas "adverse to the distinction between gross and ordinary
negligence."42 Citing Justice Bradley in Railroad Co. v. Lock-
wood, a case involving a suit to recover damages for injury suf-fered by the plaintiff while traveling on the defendant com-pany's train, Fuller noted that the different categories of negli-
gence were
indicative rather of the degree of care and diligence
which is due from a party and which he fails to per-
form, than of the amount of inattention, carelessness
or stupidity which he exhibits. If very little care is duefrom him, and he fails to bestow that little, it is called
gross negligence. If very great care is due, and he fails
to come up to the mark required, it is called slightnegligence. And if ordinary care is due, such as a pru-
dent man would exercise in his own affairs, failure to
bestow that amount of care is called ordinary negli-
gence. In each case the negligence, whatever epithet
we give it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which
the situation demands; and hence it is more strictly
accurate, perhaps, to call it simply "negligence. '43
Given this growing tendency to abandon the three-tier ap-proach to negligence, it is not surprising that some commenta-
tors argued that the Pennsylvania and New York approaches
were governed not by different rules but, in fact, by the samerule that "directors in any corporation must devote the
amount of care to the business which ordinary men would give
under the circumstances. '44 In other words, the required de-gree of care was not merely to avoid gross negligence, nor wasit the degree of care that a prudent individual would exercise
41. HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 115-16.
42. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 151 (quoting Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 WALL
357, 382 (1873)).
43. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 WALL 357, 382
(1873)).
44. Note, Liability of Corporation Directors for Negligence, 19 HARV. L. REv.
613, 613 (1906).
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in conducting his business affairs, but rather an intermediate
standard of the degree of care that a prudent person would
exercise in similar circumstances.
Another means by which late nineteenth century thinkers
mediated the tensions between moralism and coercion was
custom, a concept that reflected the promise of social har-
mony without the need for legal and social coercion. 45 Some
courts thus held that directors were required to exercise the
diligence that is customary in their industry: "Not the ordinary
care which a man takes of his own business, but the ordinary
care of a bank director in the business of a bank. Negligence is
the want of care according to the circumstances, and the cir-
cumstances are everything considering the question."46 In a
similar manner, one author attempted to reconcile the Penn-
sylvania and New York approaches by pointing out that Hun
involved the actions of directors of a savings bank, engaged in
solicitation of business from "small depositors who are seeking
safety for their earnings rather than a high rate of interest."
The court was thus correct in imposing on directors of such an
institution a stricter duty than that which applied to the direc-
tors of the "for-profit corporation" involved in Spering's Ap-
peal.4 7
By the early twentieth century, most legal commentators,
whether they endorsed the standard of the ordinary sef-inter-
ested individual, the ordinary individual in similar circum-
stances, the ordinary director, or the ordinary director in any
given industry, criticized those who exempted directors from
liability unless they were grossly negligent. 48 Reflecting the
prevailing sentiment, Frederick Dwight wrote:
45. HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 122-23.
46. Bolles, supra note 21, at 290-91 (quoting Chief Justice Paxson in
Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 414 (Pa. 1892)). See also M.C. Lynch, Dili-
gence of Directors in the Management of Corporations, 3 CAL. L. REv. 21, 29 (1914)
(noting that it might be "advisable to divide corporations into several classes
for this purpose . . . Such a classification might be as follows: (a) ordinary
manufacturing, mining, or trading corporations; (b) monied corporations,
as banks or insurance companies; (c) public service corporations; (d) chari-
table, educational, or religious corporations.").
47. Note, supra note 44.
48. See similarly Horsey, supra note 19, at 974 ("By the early part of [the
twentieth] century, courts across the country accepted the proposition that
officers and directors of industrial concerns, as well as banks, and their ma-
jority shareholders stood in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation and
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University Law School
2009]
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AD BUSINESS
Where else in human affairs may be found so admira-
ble a combination of distinction without anxiety, of
reward without toil? Would it not be well for the cor-
porations and society at large if penalties that are ad-
mitted to be proper in the abstract were insisted
upon until the prodigious number of pseudo-direc-
tors who are now in evidence were "squeezed out,"
and a really hard-working director, as distinguished
from an officer, became less of an anomaly than he
seems under present conditions?49
Woodrow Wilson was even more pointed. Calling for a
higher standard of liability, he noted that without it any at-
tempt to impose liability on directors was like "a game of hide
and seek, with the objects of [the] search taking refuge now
behind the tree of their individual personality, now behind
that of their corporate irresponsibility. '50
Moreover, by the 1910s, both Delaware and New Jersey,
informed by New York's approach, found directors liable when
their actions deviated from those of the reasonable director. 51
By that time, even the Pennsylvania courts rejected the Sper-
ing's Appeal approach and moved closer to the Hun court's po-
sition. 52
The rhetoric of ordinary negligence remained viable
through most of the twentieth century. But the meaning of
ordinary negligence changed as each generation of jurists of-
fered a different description of the directors' status, ultimately
returning to the standard of gross negligence. I begin, in the
following section, with the Progressives. They rejected the
to their minority shareholders. Courts recognized that directors, as quasi-
trustees, should be judged by fiduciary standards of not simply good faith
but prudent conduct.").
49. Dwight, supra note 32, at 42. See also Lynch, supra note 46, at 25 ("The
doctrine that directors should be liable for gross negligence only does not
seem to receive sympathetic support in the popular mind nor in the general
declarations of the courts.").
50. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPA-
TION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 11-12 (1913), cited in Lynch,
supra note 46, at 41.
51. Lubben & Damell, supra note 11, at 596-97.
52. McMurray, supra note 12, at 607 n.13, 610 and cases cited therein. See
also C. Brewster Rhoads, Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Mismanage-
ment, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 128 (1916) (discussing the transformation in the
Pennsylvania courts).
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classical legal thinkers' description of directors as agents and
instead proclaimed directors to be trustees subject to height-
ened duties. As the second part of this article will explore, in
the 1930s these ideas were cemented into corporate law albeit
for a very short time.
D. From Agents to Trustees
Throughout the nineteenth century directors were de-
scribed as both agents and trustees. 53 Yet courts and commen-
tators seemed to agree that while the directors' role was simi-
lar to that of agents and trustees, these labels were not entirely
accurate when applied to directors.54 By the end of the nine-
teenth century, however, amidst a vital transformation of
American legal thought, each label had become ideologically
charged.
Take, for example, the majority opinion in Briggs. As
Chief Justice Fuller's rhetorical critique of the different cate-
gories of negligence indicated, his decision was deeply
grounded in late nineteenth century classical legal thought; it
rested on the assumption that the role of law was to demarcate
the appropriate boundaries between a private sphere of indi-
vidual freedom and a public sphere of state (coercive) power.
The governance of the modern corporation was a private mat-
ter to be determined by those affected by it, that is, the share-
holders. 55 In this vein, for Fuller, directors' duties were the
duties of private agents. 56
The description of directors as agents and their liability as
derived from the law of agency fit the contractual vision of cor-
porate entities, which classical legal thinkers endorsed. Ac-
cordingly, corporations were associations of individuals, not
very different from partnerships; these individuals, the share-
holders, elected directors as agents to manage their property.
Proponents of the agency theory went so far as to suggest that
the shareholders were to share in the blame for directorial
53. Liability of Directors of Corporations, 6 S.L. REv.n.s. 385, 387 (1880-81).
54. McMurray, supra note 12, at 605-06 and cites therein.
55. See similarly R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS
OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890-1920, 92 (1982) (discussing
Fuller's decisions in the Slaughter House and Munn cases).
56. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 147.
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mismanagement because they were negligent in selecting their
agents. 5 7
But the contractual paradigm could not accommodate
the dramatic changes in business structure at the turn of the
twentieth century. While antebellum businesses typically were
single-unit enterprises owned by small groups of investors,
businesses were becoming multi-unit enterprises in the late
nineteenth century. As maximizing output from the new econ-
omies of scale required large capital investments, which most
individuals lacked, firms began to draw capital from widely dis-
persed individuals. The contractual paradigm, which repre-
sented the corporation as the aggregated property of its share-
holders, seemed to ignore the recognized truth that owner-
ship in large public corporations was rapidly separating from
control; in other words, "individual corporators were responsi-
ble neither for much of the growth within a given corporation
nor for the adverse consequences of corporate actions."58
The classical liberal approach of identifying directors as
agents and applying traditional agency law to the modern pub-
lic corporation also raised serious doctrinal problems. If share-
holders were principals, then unanimous shareholder consent
was the corporation's ultimate authority. Such an understand-
ing stood in direct contradiction both to the increasing passiv-
ity of shareholders and to the growing legislative and judicial
acceptance, in the late nineteenth century, of majority share-
holder voting to approve charter amendments and fundamen-
tal transactions. Moreover, if directors were agents, agency law
prohibited them from delegating their powers, thus prevent-
57. Keith F. Warren, Looking Back: Selections from the Banking, Financial and
Economic Thought of the Past Which Apply to Today's Problems, BANKERS' MACA-
ZINE 1896, Oct. 1941, at 330, available at APS Online (quoting from October
1891: "whenever a bank has been unfortunate in the selection of directors
are the stockholders wholly relieved from liability themselves? For, how came
the directors to occupy their positions-were they not the choice of the
stockholders? And thus we see at last that the management of a bank falls on
them; the directors and managers are only their agents selected to do their
bidding. While they ought not to escape if they have neglected their duties,
neither ought the stockholders to be permitted to throw the blame which,
after all, must rest on themselves.").
58. Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corpora-
tion in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1464-65 (1987).
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University Law School
[Vol. 5:63
EVOLITFON OF DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
ing them from empowering the corporation's executives. This
directly conflicted with corporate practice. 59
Not surprisingly, by the early twentieth century, the view
that directors were agents of the shareholders came under at-
tack, and with it the entire worldview espoused by classical le-
gal thinkers. Justice Harlan's dissent in Briggs anticipated the
Progressives' critique of classical legal thought.
Beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in the late
nineteenth century, Progressive legal thinkers described the
classicist vision as obscuring the inherently political nature of
law. They (and the legal realists who followed them in the
1920s and 1930s) argued that, by employing the public-private
distinction and thus treating the market as natural and neu-
tral, classical legal thought had obscured the role of the state
in distributing wealth and power, and particularly in strength-
ening the position of business corporations. Progressives and
legal realists rejected the distinction between a supposedly
non-coercive private sphere of individual rights and a coercive
public sphere of state regulation as fundamentally misguided
because all relations among private parties were premised on
the existence and enforcement of the law of contracts and
property by the state. Private law was thus a form of coercive
public law.60
59. See similarly Rudolph E. Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors,
19 B.U.L. REv. 12, 12-13 (1939) ("It needs no labored argument to show that
the doctrine which likens corporate directors to agents is not supported by
the law of agency, for an agent's authority is derived from his principal, and
may also be revoked by him, while the powers of corporate directors do not
emanate from the corporate entity and are ordinarily not subject to revoca-
tion"); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv.
L. REv. 1277, 1306 (1984) (noting that the statutory allocation of the power
to manage the corporation to the board of directors undercuts the idea that
shareholders voluntarily delegate power to the board); Deborah A. DeMott,
Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REv. 1049, 1051-52 (2007) (noting that "within
U.S. corporate law, a corporation's shareholders do not have a relationship
of common law agency with the corporation's directors. To be sure, direc-
tors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, but direc-
tors, once elected, hold powers of management that are not delegated pow-
ers comparable to a common law agent's authority.").
60. On Progressive legal thought and legal realism, see HORWTZ, supra
note 17; Dalia Tsuk, Legal Realism, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLTI-
CAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 892, 893 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed.,
2000).
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As if foreseeing the later Progressives' critique, and in
contrast to Fuller's description of directors as private agents,
Justice Harlan described corporations as public entities and
analogized the directors' position to that of public officials. Ac-
cordingly, directors held honorable public positions and, with
them, accompanying public duties.
Indeed, Progressive legal scholars insisted that the board
of directors was created by the state, not by the shareholders.
The board's power was thus original and undelegated. 61 The
power of the corporation was the power of the board. 62 With
this in mind, most legal scholars also described directors as
trustees of their corporations and "consequently... burdened
with the duty of diligently and faithfully discharging" the du-
ties imposed on them "by the laws of the corporation and the
State." If no "specific statutory prescription" existed, directors
were "bound to exercise such care as the nature of [their] su-
pervision requires." 63
Viewing the board's power as original and undelegated
was consistent with the real entity theory of the corporation
favored by Progressives. At the turn of the twentieth century,
the real entity theory competed with the contractual theory to
describe the modern public corporation. The real entity the-
ory developed out of natural entity theory. Natural entity the-
ory described corporations as separate entities, distinct from
their individual members and having real existence, with
rights and liabilities similar to those of persons (specifically,
constitutional rights and criminal and tort liabilities). Progres-
sive legal thinkers, who did not accept the personification of
the corporation (especially the idea that corporations, like in-
61. See I. Maurice Wormser, Directors-Or Figures of Earth?, 1 BROOK L.
REv. 28, 28 (1932) ("The powers of the board of directors are derivative only
in the sense of being received from the sovereign in the charter of incorpo-
ration.").
62. HORW1TZ, supra note 17, at 99-100. See also David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 215 (noting the difference between the"traditional principles [which] vested ultimate managerial power in the
shareholders, with directors enjoying only such responsibility as actually wasdelegated" and the early-twentieth century "legal doctrine" which "came to
locate managerial power in the directors as a matter of law, regardless of any
express delegation .. .[and] the directors' powers ... [as] ... coextensive
with those of the corporation itself.").
63. P. B. McKenzie, Liability of Directors Who Do Not Direct, 18 BENCH & B.
o.s. 100 (1909); see also Rhoads, supra note 52, at 139-44.
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dividuals, should have constitutional rights), nonetheless saw
corporate existence as real and not merely as a contractual ar-
rangement. They employed the real entity theory pragmati-
cally-it offered an accurate description of corporate reality,
with its multiplicity of ownership, complex financial structure,
managerial control, immortality, and, most important,
power. 64 It is with this vision that the twentieth century conver-
sations about the status, role, and liability of the board of di-
rectors began.
As the second part of this article explores, concerns about
corporate power led scholars to develop a particular vision of
the corporation's role in society. Viewing corporations as real
entities and equating board power with corporate power were
aspects of this vision. While late nineteenth century discus-
sions centered on the allocation of liability between directors
and executives, the early-twentieth century's concerns were fo-
cused on the role of directors in taming the growing power of
the control group, be it controlling shareholders or manage-
ment. As Progressive legal thought came to dominate Ameri-
can legal discourse in the early 1930s, so did the vision of di-
rectors as trustees for the corporation, its shareholders (specif-
ically its minority shareholders), and the community. The
notion that directors were agents of their shareholders disap-
peared, at least for a while. It forcefully returned at the end of
the twentieth century.
II.
1900s-1930s: DIRECTORS AS TRUSTEES
A. Corporate Power
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic
growth in the scale of private business organizations. Increas-
ing consumer demand, rising numbers of skilled and unskilled
workers, and an expanding pool of capital made the creation
64. Dalia Tsuk, Corporations without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corpo-
rate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REi. 1861, 1870-73 (2003) and cites therein. The best
contemporaneous summary of the debates about the nature of corporations
and other associations remains John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corpo-
rate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655-73 (1926). For recent discussions, see
Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real En-
tity' Theory, 50 U. Pirr. L. REv. 575 (1989); Mark, supra note 58; Millon, supra
note 62.
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of large enterprises possible, while corporate lawyers created a
variety of legal devices to help their clients increase the scope
of their operations through "cooperation and combina-
tions."65 Trusts, holding companies, and mergers became com-
mon, even if often contested in state courts. 66 The nineteenth-
century corporation, which was subject to strict constraints on
its powers as well as limitations on its capital structure, was re-
placed by larger and larger units. Between 1888 and 1896, New
Jersey revised its general incorporation statute to eliminate re-
strictions on "capitalization and assets, mergers and consolida-
tions, the issuance of voting stock, the purpose(s) of incorpo-
ration, and the duration and locale of business. 67 Other states
(including Delaware, which would soon become the revolu-
tion's leader) followed suit, enacting incorporation statutes
that were more enabling than mandatory. 68 And corporations
were quick to use the power that these enabling statutes
granted them. Between 1898 and 1901, "2,274 firms disap-
peared as a result of merger, and merger capitalization totaled
$5.4 billion.."69
The concentration of power in the trusts and large busi-
ness corporations undermined traditional understandings of
economic and political markets. Progressives worried that cor-
porations were wearing away the function of the individual
producer and, with it, nineteenth-century democratic and eco-
nomic ideals. These ideals were the power of markets equally
to "distribute the rewards of individual industry" and to help
65. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 130 (William W. Fisher, III, MortonJ. Hor-
witz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
66. See id. at 131 (tracing the development of corporate ownership struc-
tures and corresponding government regulations); see also ROLAND MAR-
CHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN Bic BUSINESS 7 (1998) (noting the prolifer-
ation of corporate mergers between 1895 and 1904).
67. Scorr R. BowmN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996).
68. Id.
69. Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26
Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 161 (1982). It is important to note that the term.merger" is misleading as many of these transactions were sales of assets for
stock. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY:. How FINANCE
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 292-93 n.33 (2007).
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"conform individual liberty" to socially beneficial ends.7°
Progressives were concerned that giant corporations obfus-
cated "the traditional relationships between individual liberty,
competition and social utility. ' 71 They therefore emphasized
the need to control and restrain corporate power.
Some reformers emphasized the need to control business
units locally in order to encourage civic participation and to
keep corporate power in check. Others wanted to subject large
corporations to national regulation. 72 Interestingly, while en-
dorsing two presumably opposing positions-decentralization
and centralization of power, respectively-both groups of
scholars and policymakers chose mandatory disclosure as the
ultimate means of regulating corporate power.
73
Given the scope of the problem of corporate power, and
the attempt nationally to use mandatory disclosure to regulate
it, courts did not systematically address the matter. Moreover,
by the early 1930s, courts were typically more concerned about
protecting corporations from potential bankruptcy proceed-
ings than taming their power. Butjurists did not shy away from
exploring the relationship between the evolving doctrines of
corporate law and the need to prevent potential abuses of cor-
porate power. Using as a springboard Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and
Gardiner C. Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty,7 4 the "ur-text" of modern corporate governance, 75 the fol-
lowing sections examine these early 1930s scholarly endeavors.
I should stress that my analysis in these sections is limited
to exploring a strand of corporate law that has often been ig-
nored or misunderstood. I argue that in the late 1920s and
early 1930s, even as many became concerned about saving cor-
porate America, a particular school of thought remained fo-
70. L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental
Property, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 596, 618 (1988).
71. Id. at 619. For a detailed analysis of these concerns and their impact
on Progressive thought, see MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 90-112.
72. On the positions of decentralization and centralization, see MICHAEL
J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY's DiSCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOS-
oPHY 211-21 (1996).
73. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1516-19 (2006).
74. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
75. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 14.
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cused on abuses of corporate power, specifically by the controlgroup. These scholars described corporations as sovereign (or
semi-sovereign) entities, accepted them as such, but wanted toconstrain those who controlled them. Directors were assignedthe task of reining in the control group. They were comparedto public officials and viewed as trustees not only for the cor-
poration but also for the community at large.
Each of the works discussed in the following sections por-trayed directors as trustees, even as authors debated for whom
exactly they were trustees. Because these works have oftenbeen misinterpreted, their cumulative impact has escaped
scholarly attention. As I argue, when read in their historicalcontext, these works support the conclusion that the first sta-tus legal scholars assigned to directors in the twentieth century
was that of trustees (with corresponding heightened duties).This vision immensely influenced the policies of the NewDeal. 76 It also helped legitimate the powerful public corpora-tion. As the third part of this article will explore, by the mid1930s, as concerns about corporate power dissipated, a differ-
ent definition of the director's status prevailed-it described
directors as representatives of the shareholders and assigned
them the more limited task of mediating potential intra-corpo-rate conflicts between the shareholders and the corporation's
executives. When the courts endorsed this vision, they used itto justify their deference to directors' discretion. In doing so,they eroded the high standard of liability associated with theconcept of trust and lay the foundation for the restatement ofthe business judgment rule-originally a rule recognizinghuman mistakes-as a rule shielding directors from liability.
B. The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Berle and Means's The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty was one of the earliest attempts to connect the emergenceof giant corporations with the political and social changes oc-
76. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 179, 195-96 (2005).Jurists also believed that the courts could enforce these trust obligations. Butthe idea of imposing a unified conception of social trusteeship on directors(and corporations) became less feasible after the U.S. Supreme Court deci-sion in ErieRR Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) put an end to the idea offederal common law. Id. at 204.
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curring in a rapidly growing industrialized society. While in
the collective imagination of corporate law scholars, the book
is remembered for its exegesis of the separation of ownership
from control in large public corporations, Berle and Means's
interests focused on corporate power. Their analysis rested on
the assumption that corporations were centers of political and
economic power equivalent to the power of the state. This as-
sumption helped sustain the idea that directors were trustees
for the community. In turn, viewing directors as trustees
helped ameliorate concerns about corporate power that this
assumption raised.77
Berle and Means's ideas are traceable to early-twentieth
century political theories that made the group rather than the
individual the focus of legal and political analysis. Resisting
both the radical collectivist vision of Marxists and socialists and
the individualism of traditional liberal thought, political scien-
tists described groups, specifically functional groups like labor
unions, as the fora where individuals found meaning for their
ideas and actions. They argued in favor of adding groups, or-
ganizations, and associations to the existing array of local and
state governments as the bases of the modern American state.
78
77. For a detailed description of this vision, which I have labeled legal
pluralism, and its history, see id. at 185-94; Tsuk, supra note 64, at 1887-88.
78. These political scientists are remembered collectively as political plu-
ralists but their ideas varied. Some political pluralists argued that because
individuals organized themselves into groups to pursue their interests,
groups and organizations were loci of participation and representation.
They believed that by exploring the role of groups in society they could offer
a more realistic description of liberal democratic politics and the limited
role of the liberal state. An example of the work of these theorists is ARTHUR
BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 465-80 (1908). Other political plural-
ists not only recognized the existence of a multiplicity of centers of self-gov-
ernment in society, but also embraced it as a constitutive element of democ-
racy. These theorists argued that the state was too broad and abstract a body
to command loyalty and allegiance from individuals, who associated more
easily with diverse groups and organizations than with a unified state entity.
By conceiving of sovereignty as distributive or multiple and by encouraging
the growth of organizations such as labor unions, these political theorists
sought to guarantee the flourishing of diverse and valuable forms of identi-
ties, Ways of life, experiences, and viewpoints. For examples of these theo-
rists' arguments, see JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927);
MARY P. FOLLETr, THE NEW STATE: GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1918); HAROLD J. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University Law School
20091
NYU JOURNAL OF LAW AND BUSINESS
Drawing on such ideas, corporate legal scholars like Berleand Means recognized the significant role of corporations inan industrialized society as economic and social bases for de-mocracy and, accordingly, described them as real entitieswhose existence was both real and distinct from their individ-ual members. 79 But while, for the most part, political theoristswere not concerned about the power that collective entitiesmight exercise (trusting labor unions and corporations to self-regulate their activities), Progressive corporate law scholars ex-posed corporations as loci of coercive power over their mem-bers, nonmembers, and other associations, power that liberallegal thought treated as free contractual arrangements be-tween individuals. By the 1920s, the potentials and risks of cor-porate (and group) power came to dominate conversations
about corporate law and theory.
In this vein, Berle and Means wrote that the separation ofownership from control allowed tremendous buildups ofpower, and that given corporations' economic power, it was
meaningless to assume that corporations were private associa-tions, or that the state was the only center of coercive (public)power. Corporate power, they explained, was "comparable tothe concentration of religious power in the medieval church
or of political power in the national state."80
Berle and Means (and their colleagues) believed that, inprinciple, corporations should be allowed to exercise their
powers freely but that courts should tame potential abuses ofpower by imposing on organizations limitations resemblingthe constraints on sovereign power. 81 They wanted corpora-
SovEREiGN-Y (1917). For a sample of articles by the most known (British)political pluralists, see THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF G. D. H. COLE, J. N. FicGis, AND H.J. LASKI (Paul Q. Hirst, ed., 1989).For a contemporaneous critique of political pluralism, see W. Y. ELLIOTr,
THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS: SYNDICALISM, FASCISM, AND THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL STATE (1928), For an analysis of pluralists' scholarship, see EARL
LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT LEGISLA-
TION 12-13 (1952) and, more recently, AvGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCT-
ING POLITICAL PLURALISM (1995).
79. Hager, supra note 64, at 579-80.
80. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 74, at 352.81. See similarly Chester Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corporate Law, 35COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (1935) ("[T]he 'New Deal' has definitely takenthe view that corporations which sell securities to the public or whose securi-ties are traded in on exchanges are not merely private business organizations
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tions to exercise their power to benefit the community at
large.
Indeed, having called attention to corporate power, as
augmented by the separation of ownership from control, Berle
and Means rejected the traditional ways of restraining corpo-
rate power that were grounded in the common law rules of
property and contracts. The application of strict property rules
to passive ownership, they argued, would require the control
group to exercise corporate power for the benefit of the share-
holder and put "the bulk of American industry" in the service
of "inactive and irresponsible security owners." 82 Strict con-
tractual rules, in turn, would have vested the control group
with uncurbed power. Instead, Berle and Means proclaimed
that "by surrendering control and responsibility over the active
property," shareholders had released the community from the
obligation fully to protect their property rights and cleared the
way for placing "the community in a position to demand that
the modern corporation serve not [only] the owners or the
control [group] but all society." 83 Corporate power was, ac-
cordingly, power in trust for the community.
Yet, while defining corporate power as power in trust,
Berle and Means said little about the appropriate role or liabil-
ity of the board of directors. Turning to cases that rejected the
three-tier classification of negligence, they announced that the
idea that directors were only liable for fraud or gross negli-
but are 'public' institutions which, whether or not they are engaged in a
business 'affected with a public interest,' are subject to special governmental
supervision.").
82. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 74, at 354.
83. Id. at 354-57. It is important to remember that Berle and Means's
analysis of corporate power also drew upon the Progressives' critique of the
public-private distinction and their conceptualization of property rights as a
delegation of coercive power to individuals. Berle and Means argued that
because property, especially corporate property, was a means by which the
state legitimated the use of nongovernmental coercive power, the state could
require those in control of such power to promote the public interest. The
classic critique of the distinction between public and private power remains
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). On the Progressives' view of property rights, see
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
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gence gave way to a standard duty of care, 84 but their analysis
went no further. Corporate power was power in trust, but howsuch a statement affected the directors' role or liability re-
mained unclear. Indeed, in order to understand the early1930s ideal of directors as trustees, we need to examine not
only legal scholars' concerns about corporate power but also
their distress about corporate control. As the following sec-
tions elaborate, Berle, Means, and their contemporaries were
alarmed less by corporate power per se than by the concentra-
tion of corporate control in the hands of a few investment
bankers and controlling shareholders (and, to a more limited
extent, management). They wanted the corporate director to
act as trustee, subject to heightened duties and liabilities, to
tame the control group. Specifically, they wanted to constrain
the control group's ability to harm, through its participation
in corporate management or through market manipulation,
both the community at large and the individual shareholder.Today we often describe the interests of the individual share-
holder and the community as divergent. But because these
early twentieth century scholars were concerned about both
the external and the internal dimensions of corporate power,
85 they viewed them as complementary.8 6
84. BERLE & MEANs, supra note 74, at 202-203. For a similar view, see
Wormser, supra note 61, at 29-35 ("[D]irectors owe to the corporation theduty to exercise that degree of ordinary care and diligence and of reasona-
ble business knowledge and skill which are required under the circum-stances of the particular case as applicable to the type of corporation in ques-tion. Not less than ordinary care and diligence, not less than a reasonable
degree of business judgment and prudence, are required. For failure tocomply with the obligations imposed by this duty, directors may be held per-sonally liable .... Directors actually must direct. If a person is unwilling toassume the obligation to direct, his remedy is simple-he need not becomea director.... for it is butjust and right that a man should be as careful in
employing the funds of others as he would be with his own.").
85. According to Berle and Means, the external dimension of power fo-
cused on the corporation's impact on society, specifically the corporation'spower to control markets by administering prices, its capacity to accumulate
capital and affect the economy, and its ability to shape the forces of produc-
tion through the development of new technologies. The internal dimension
focused on the power of the corporation over individuals within it. BERLE &MEANS, supra note 74, at 6-7; BowMAN, supra note 67, at 207-8.
86. Discussing the relationship between community interests and share-holders interests is beyond the scope of this paper. Gerald Frug, in his excel-lent analysis of bureaucratic and corporate power, argues that Progressive
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C. The Problem of Control
Despite the growing dispersal of share ownership in the
early twentieth century, control of businesses became highly
concentrated. Moreover, by the 1910s, banks began to play a
triple role-they were commercial lenders, institutional inves-
tors, and investment bankers. "By 1912, 18 financial institu-
tions sat on the boards of 134 corporations with $25.325 bil-
lion in combined assets. Of these 18 institutions, 5 banks... sat
on the boards of 68 nonfinancial corporations with $17.273
billion in assets... U.S. GNP in 1912 was $39.4 billion.
8 7
By virtue of their capital and social networks, investment
bankers became, as Brandeis put it in 1914, "[t]he dominant
element in our financial oligarchy."88 They became promoters
and directors of corporations, and were able, through their
economic power and the use of legal devices such as voting
trusts and non-voting stock, to control even those boards on
which they did not sit.8 9 Gradually, investment bankers re-
placed control through complete ownership and even control
through ownership of a large block of the votes. 90
The individual shareholder, who in the early decades of
the twentieth century gradually became a speculator, 91 was
not necessarily troubled by these transformations, at least as
long as she "held [a] soaring stock." 92 But economists and
lawyers raised concerns about the growing power of the con-
trol group. They worried that the more dispersed stock owner-
corporate law scholars were able to reconcile the interests of the individual
shareholder with those of the community by emphasizing that directors were
trustees and arguing that, as trustees, directors were authorized to deter-
mine the subjective interests of the different corporate constituencies. Frug,
supra note 59, at 1308.
87. Miguel Cantillo Simon, The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United
States: 1890-1939, 88 AM. ECON. Riv. 1077, 1081 (1998). For a detailed ac-
count of these developments, see Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1520-28.
88. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 3 (1914).
89. See id. at 1-27.
90. Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American
Industry, 46 Q. J. ECON. 68, 72-74 (1931).
91. On the shareholder as speculator, see MITCHELL, supra note 69, at
chs. 4 & 8; Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform:
Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 391-94 (1977).
92. RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 7
(1964).
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ship became, the easier it was for the larger shareholders-
typically, life insurance companies, trust companies, and
banks-to control the activities of the corporation. 93 Indeed,
when Berle and Means called attention to the growing separa-
tion of ownership from control in large business corporations,
they pointedly explained that individual shareholders lost con-
trol not only to management, but also to larger investors who,
even without owning a majority of the shares, were able to
elect the board of directors. 9 4
Control by a minority of the owners-be it the investment
banking house, a small controlling block, or even manage-
ment-was alarming mostly because of its potential for abuse
and manipulation. "Power without responsibility is, philosoph-
ically, a perilous matter," Berle wrote in 1925, and "the history
of minority-controlled corporations during the last thirty years
amply demonstrates that the hazard is not imaginary. '9 5
The role played by investment banks raised even deeper
concerns. As Berle explained, because management stock
would likely be controlled by the investment banking housethat served as a promoter for the corporation, "it [was] possi-
ble, if not probable, that there [would] be attractive opportu-
nities for manipulation of securities, for negotiating favorable
contracts with allied interests, or even for giving value to stock
which represent[ed] no real investment. '96 Given the "web ofeconomic interests" which the investment banking house
served and from which it made its profits, it was likely thatmanagement stock would be voted for transactions that bene-
fited the investment banking house, or even the controlling
groups, but not the controlled corporation. 97 Sharing Berle's
views, William 0. Douglas labeled the interests of investment
banking houses "high finance," charging that they were "inter-
ested solely in the immediate profit."98 According to Douglas,
93. For a less concerned view of the control group, see Franklin S. Wood,
The Status of Management Stockholders, 38 YALE L.J. 57 (1928) (arguing against
imposing stricter fiduciary duties on controlling stockholders).
94. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 74, at 66-111.
95. Adolf A. Berle,Jr., Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control, "39 HAmv. L.
REv. 673, 674 (1925-26).
96. Id. at 676.
97. Id.
98. William 0. Douglas, The Forces of Disorder, Address delivered at the
University of Chicago (Oct. 27, 1936) with additions from talks before the
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the interests of high finance were different from those of small
individual shareholders or even the corporation, but with the
power of control, high finance was able to profit by siphoning
money from other investors.99
It was in this context that scholars like Berle and Means
began to express concerns about the relationship between the
individual shareholder and its corporation. The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property concluded that:
[T]he usual stockholder has little power over the af-
fairs of the enterprise and his vote, if he has one, is
rarely capable of being used as an instrument of dem-
ocratic control. The separation of ownership and
control has become virtually complete. The bulk of
the owners have in fact almost no control over the
enterprise, while those in control hold only a negligi-
ble proportion of the total ownership.100
While Berle and Means did not necessarily think share-
holders could effectively participate in corporate manage-
ment, they strongly believed in the potential effectiveness of
fiduciary duties. Accordingly, their proclamation that corpo-
rate power was power in trust meant that directors, as trustees,
were responsible for preventing those in control from abusing
their power, especially their power to direct the affairs of the
corporation and their power to manipulate the stock market.
Concerns about market manipulation also led Berle to ar-
gue that directors were trustees for the corporation's share-
holders. Because he viewed the questions through the lenses
of corporate power and corporate control, Berle saw the obli-
gations of directors to the community and to the shareholders,
especially minority shareholders, as complementary. Begin-
ning in the late 1930s, however, mainstream corporate legal
scholarship rejected Berle's concerns. His statements about
the subject have thus been misunderstood. At least in part, the
Economic Club of Chicago (Feb. 1, 1938) and before the Bond Club of New
York (Mar. 24, 1937), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUB-
LIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 9 (James Allen ed., 1940).
99. Id.
100. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 74, at 83. See also Means, supra note 90, at
97 (noting that "[t]he individualism of Adam Smith's private enterprise has
in large measure given way to the collective activity of the modern corpora-
tion, and economic theory must shift its emphasis from analysis in terms of
competition to analysis in terms of control.").
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confusion reaches back to Berle's debate with E. Merrick
Dodd about directors' trusteeship duties. The following sec-
tion provides background for the debate by briefly summariz-
ing the Progressives' concerns about fraudulent market prac-
tices. I will then demonstrate how Berle's argument that direc-
tors were trustees for the shareholders was shaped by his early
work on the duties of directors toward individual sharehold-
ers. In these early writings, his concerns focused on market
manipulation by the control group.
D. The Risks of Market Manipulation
Preventing those in control of the corporation from
manipulating stock price was the focus of much discussion in
the first two decades of the twentieth century. The typical con-
text in which it arose was directors' (and officers') purchase of
stock in their corporation. Focusing on the liability of corpo-
rate directors "to stockholders from whom or to whom they
buy or sell stock," jurists narrowed down the issue to "the ques-
tion of whether the trading director must disclose his knowl-
edge of the corporate affairs to the stockholder, and if so, how,
and to what extent."101
By the 1920s, many considered the separation of owner-
ship from control and the rise of professional management as
creating increased corporate gains and profits. Management
was seen as "the prime mover of business-the veritable foun-
tain-head of economic security for the bulk of the popula-
tion. ' ' 10 2 With this in mind, while some legal scholars held di-
rectors as fiduciaries not only to the corporation but also to its
individual shareholders, others (perhaps even the majority po-
sition), argued that stockholders were "quite as apt to be
strong, wise, and sagacious as directors. '10 3 Moreover, they
proclaimed that anonymous markets made disclosure by direc-
tors and officers unfeasible. 10 4
Berle, writing in 1928, sided with advocates of the former
position. "With neither power nor information, the stock-
101. Adolf A. Berle, Publicity of Accounts, Management Purchase of Stock and
Control of Security Value, in STUDIES IN THE LAw OF CORI'ORATIONS FINANCE 177
(1928).
102. Business Versus the Public, 8 AccT. REv. 162 (1933).
103. Berle, supra note 101, at 178.
104. Id. at 177-79.
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holder becomes merely the beneficiary-cestui-of the corpo-
rate management," he wrote. "Deprive him of any right by way
of fiduciary relation, and the business becomes too hazardous
to continue." As Berle saw it, the fiduciary duties of directors
and officers extended to the corporation as well as to its share-
holders.105
Indeed, while it seemed efficient to let professional execu-
tives run corporations, tremendous imbalances of power
lurked in this arrangement because of the lack of federal laws
requiring and regulating corporate disclosure and inadequate
self-regulation by the exchanges. By virtue of their positions,
individual businessmen were thus able to benefit at the ex-
pense of the public. As one editorial put it, "[mlany manage-
ments, swollen with power, came to believe that their enter-
prises had ceased to be reservoirs of trust funds for stockhold-
ers and creditors but had become agencies for their own
private immediate gain." 106 Huge salaries and bonuses, man-
agement's participation in its own underwriting, using corpo-
rate funds to manipulate the market, and other forms of self-
dealing became common. Rather than being an "economic
savior," management turned out to be "often without vision,
incapable of self-regulation, unmindful of duties to investors,
and almost unaware of its responsibilities to society as a
whole." 107
The market's collapse in October 1929 painfully brought
home the consequences of the "feverish activity of specula-
tion" that characterized the 1920s.108 But the blame for the
crash was laid not only on speculation, but also on the fraudu-
lent practices which helped fuel speculation: inadequate cor-
105. Id. at 179-81.
106. Business Versus the Public, supra note 102, at 163.
107. Id. Stock market manipulation was not a novel idea. See, e.g., A Soulless
Corporation, THE INDEPENDENT, June 18, 1863, available at APS Online (re-
porting that the directors of the Cleveland and Toledo Railroad Company
used their control of the company's books privately to acquire sufficient
stock to guarantee their reelection); The Mismanagement of Railway and Other
Corporations and the Remedy, THE ALBION, Nov. 28, 1868, available at APS On-
line ("The reckless manner in which the directors of railway and other com-
panies have increased the capital stock of their respective corporations dur-
ing the last few years, and more particularly during the last eighteen months,
for stock jobbing purposes, is a grave public evil which calls for legislative
interference.").
108. DE BEDTS, supra note 92, at 11.
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porate reporting, self-perpetuating boards, managements
manipulating insider information, and faulty credit control. 10 9
The consequences were devastating. According to one re-
port, "in the ten years before 1933, total investor losses
through worthless securities were approximately $25 billion,
or half of all those issued."110 According to the same report,
even before the Depression, investors' losses "reached a stag-
gering annual total of $1.7 billion, of which $500 million alone
was accounted for within the state of New York." ' 1 Not sur-
prisingly, the securities markets (specifically, disclosure) be-
came the focal point for reform.' 12
The different drafts of the Securities Act of 1933 reflected
the idea that federal legislation should be limited to requiring
"full and fair disclosure of the nature of the security being of-
fered and that there should be no authority to pass upon the
investment quality of the security." ' 1 3 The 1934 Act focused on
the registration of the stock exchanges and the requirement
that firms traded on these exchanges file annual and quarterly
reports with a newly established agency created by the Act-
the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act further
prohibited certain manipulative devices such as short selling,
which corporate insiders and exchange members used to ex-
ploit the market, and it regulated insider trading by both man-
agement and controlling shareholders. 1 4
The Berle-Dodd debate took place shortly prior to the en-
actment of the Securities Acts. As the following section ex-
109. See H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5-6 (1934).
110. DE BEDTS, supra note 92, at 11.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 63 (1982) (quoting James Landis's recollection of the drafting of the
Securities Act of 1933). See also Rohrlich, supra note 81, at 1169 (noting that
"faith in publicity" was the theme underlying the New Deal policies).
114. DE BEDTS, supra note 92, at 76-77. See also Nelson, supra note 2, at 289
(noting that the Securities Acts "were designed to protect investors from
money managers who manipulated markets for their own profit at investors'
expense."). The section dealing with insider trading in the 1934 Act was sec-
tion 16(b), applicable to officers, directors, and shareholders who own more
than 10 percent of a company's stock in specific circumstances. The more
famous rule lOb-5, applicable to any person, was promulgated later under
section 10(b) of the Act.
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plains, it originated in Berle's attempt to use corporate law to
supplement the anticipated federal regulation by instructing
directors as to how to prevent the control group from manipu-
lating stock price and the market, more broadly. Focusing on
the relationship between directors and shareholders, it inad-
vertently set the stage for the mid twentieth century's re-envi-
sioning of directors as representatives of the shareholders
rather than as trustees for the corporation, its shareholders,
and the community. This shift will be the focus of the third
part of this article.
E. For Whom Are Corporate Directors Trustees?
The Modern Corporation and Private Property concluded that
corporate powers were powers in trust for the community. As
already noted, what this meant was less obvious. The book's
last paragraphs stated:
Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control
can stand against the paramount interests of the com-
munity.... It remains only for the claims of the com-
munity to be put forward with clarity and force. Rigid
enforcement of property rights as a temporary pro-
tection against plundering by control would not
stand in the way of the modification of these rights in
the interest of other groups. 1 5
Interestingly, shortly before the publication of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, Berle published an article that
seemed to contradict this statement, arguing that corporate
powers were held in trust for the benefit of the sharehold-
ers. 1 16
Despite such inconsistencies, one would be mistaken to
assume that Berle was of two minds when it came to the duties
of directors (and officers). Such an assumption pays too much
homage to the only public response to Berle's article-E. Mer-
rick Dodd's article, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?
Dodd, whose vision of corporate management clearly was one
of public service, was keen on validating corporate social poli-
cies that benefited the public, including employees, consum-
115. BERLE & MEANs, supra note 74, at 312.
116. Adolf A. Berle,Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV.
1049 (1931).
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ers, creditors and the community at large, even in situations in
which the result could be a diminution of profits for the share-
holders. Announcing that he was "thoroughly in sympathy
with Mr. Berle's efforts to establish a legal control which
[would] more effectually prevent corporate managers from di-
verting profits into their own pockets from those of stockhold-
ers," Dodd nonetheless emphasized that the corporation was"an economic institution" with "social service as well as a
profit-making function."'"17
Dodd's justification drew upon public opinion, specifi-
cally the views of corporate managers like Owen D. Young,
chairman and president of General Electric, who maintained
that the corporation should recognize its "public obligations
and perform its public duties-in a word, vast as it is, that it
should be a good citizen. ' 18 Yet, as I explain below, Berle's
article did not contradict such a statement. Dodd's attack was
misguided.
Berle's Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, which was writ-
ten shortly after the collapse of the market, was an argument
designed to eliminate the potential for managerial abuse of its
market powers. It was nothing more than a continuation of
Berle's 1928 article on the relationship between directors, of-
ficers, and individual shareholders.' 19 Berle wanted to protect
those who were not in control of the corporate machinery
from fraud and manipulative practices that, at the time,
plagued the securities markets. Each of the powers enumer-
ated in the article corresponded to Berle's previous writings
about the problem of control.' 20 Each was also a power previ-
ously considered a matter of contract law. 121 Berle wanted to
make these powers a matter of the directors' trusteeship du-
ties.
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust examined five powers.
First was the power to issue stock, which Berle wanted to "sub-
ject to the equitable limitation that such issue must be so ac-
complished as to protect the ratable interest of existing and
117. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45
HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1147-48 (1932).
118. Id. at 1154.
119. See supra notes 101-105.
120. Among these writings were Berle, supra note 95, at 674, and Adolf A.
Berle, High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 YALE REv. 20, 41-42 (1933).
121. Uhlnan, supra note 59, at 18.
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prospective shareholders." 122 Second was "the power to de-
clare or withhold dividends," which, as Berle argued, had to be
used so as to benefit all shareholders rather than one class of
shareholders or some shareholders within a given class. 123
Third was "the power to acquire stock in other corporations."
124 Berle wanted to guarantee that such power would not be
used "to forward the enterprises of the managers as individuals
or to subserve special interests within or without the corpora-
tion."12 5 Fourth was "the reserved power of the corporation to
amend its charter." 126 Berle argued that such power had to
"be so exercised that the result will tend to benefit the corpo-
ration as a whole, and to distribute equitably the benefit or the
sacrifice, as the case may be, between all the groups in the cor-
poration as their interest may appear."1 27 Fifth was "the power
to transfer the corporate enterprise to another enterprise by
merger, exchange of stock, sale of assets or otherwise." 128
Again, Berle wanted to guarantee that the interests of all clas-
ses of shares were "respectively recognized and substantially
protected" in such transactions. 129
Given the particular goals of his article, Berle did not an-
ticipate Dodd's rebuttal. Stressing, perhaps too apologetically,
that lawyers "know what the social theorist does not," Berle's
response to Dodd repeated that those in control did not see
themselves as fiduciaries. 130 Any weakening of their obliga-
tions toward the shareholders would thus make their power
absolute. "You cannot abandon the emphasis on 'the view that
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making
profits for their stockholders' until such time as you are pre-
pared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else," Berle wrote.13'
122. Berle, supra note 116, at 1050-60.
123. Id. at 1060-63.
124. Id. at 1063.
125. Id. at 1063-66.
126. Id. at 1066.
127. Id. at 1066-69.
128. Id. at 1069.
129. Id. at 1069-72.
130. Adolf A. Berle,Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
131. Id.
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Berle did not reject (nor recant) the view that corporate
powers were powers in trust for the community. Fraud and
market manipulation by management and the control group,
however, posed an immediate threat to the securities markets.
Berle thus argued that the corporation could play its public,
trustee role only when that threat to corporate capitalism was
removed. He agreed with Dodd that the economic power that
was "mobilized and massed under the corporate form" was
beneficial to society only as long as its excesses were prevented.
But he criticized Dodd's position as theoretically sound and
practically dangerous. Dodd's position ran the risk of under-
mining Berle's attempts both to legitimate the modern public
corporation and to constrain potential abuses of corporate
power. As Berle saw it, rather than taming corporate power, it
would bring group warfare into corporations and allow "the
massing of group after group to assert their private claims by
force or threat." 132 "Either you have a system based on individ-
ual ownership of property," he wrote, "or you do not."133
Dodd's position was elitist; it was traced back to the ideas
of "such 'best men' as Henry Adams, John Hay, and Henry
Cabot Lodge, that relied upon the breeding and values and
education of a superior class to fulfill its civic responsibility."134 Like these "best men," Dodd believed that business respect
for traditional moral values would produce material rewards
and help rejuvenate the nation. But Dodd continued to lump
together officers and directors, not recognizing the need to
create a particular role for the modern board. Berle's Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust was indeed one of the first attempts to
define a role for the board, as distinguished from managers.
Berle wanted the board to rein in those in control of the enter-
prise lest they harm not only the community but also the indi-
vidual shareholders subject to their powers. Ironically, by em-
phasizing the directors' role in protecting the corporation's
shareholders, he helped pave the road for the erosion of his
own ideas.
132. Id. at 1368.
133. Id. For more on the Berle-Dodd debate, see Tsuk, supra note 64, at
1891-96; Tsuk, supra note 76, at 205-09.
134. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEW-
EST EXPORT 187 (2001). For a broader discussion of the idea of "best men,"
see JOHN G. SPROAT, THE BEST MEN: LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE
(1968).
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As the third part of this article explains, shortly after it was
articulated, Berle's nuanced understanding of the relationship
between corporations, their directors, and the community
faded away as new concerns came to characterize discussions
about the board's role, status, and liability. Beginning with
analyses of the securities acts and rules promulgated under
them, and filtering down to the state courts' scrutiny of direc-
tors' fiduciary duties and the emergence of the modern busi-
ness judgment rule, discussions from the mid 1930s through
the 1970s focused not on corporate power or market manipu-
lation but on corporate hierarchies and the need to enhance
corporate democracy. The idea that directors were trustees for
the community, which helped legitimate corporate power, was
replaced with the notion that directors were representatives of
the shareholders. (As will become apparent, the concept of
representation was different from the notion of agency that
has characterized discussions about the board's role in the last
three decades of the twentieth century.13 5) I begin with Wil-
liam 0. Douglas's Directors Who Do Not Direct, perhaps the most
significant work to anticipate and help bring about, albeit un-
intentionally, the transformation of the prevailing view from
directors as trustees to directors as representatives.
III.
1930s-1970s: DIREcToRs AS REPRESENTATIVES
A. Directors Who Do Not Direct
Directors Who Do Not Direct was published in 1934, shortly
after the enactment of the Securities Acts, and three years
before Douglas was to become the SEC Chairman. It was re-
cently described as "the first important discussion of the ap-
propriate function of the board." '3 6
Douglas began his discussion by reiterating the "many dif-
ferent abuses and malpractices" of the 1920s-"secret loans to
officers and directors, undisclosed profit-sharing plans, timely
contracts unduly favorable to affiliated interests, dividend poli-
cies based on false estimates, manipulations of credit resources
and capital structures to the detriment of minority interests,
poor operations, and trading in securities of the company by
135. The concept of agency is discussed in the fifth part of the article.
136. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 16.
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virtue of inside information, to mention only a few."'1 37 As
Douglas saw it, all these indicated that businessmen had lost
sight of their public role. 138
Douglas believed that the newly enacted securities laws of-fered some protection to shareholders by requiring accurate
disclosure in the proxy solicitation process, but he did notthink such disclosure was sufficient. First, Douglas thought
that disclosure was inadequate if it meant "registration in somedusty file in Washington or in some state capitol."'13 9 Hewanted mandatory disclosure "in the sense of direct and une-quivocal statement in the periodical reports to stockhold-
ers."'140 As part of this, Douglas would demand disclosure of
directors' compensation, the shares traded by directors duringany given period, and directors' affiliations and conflicts of in-terests.' 4 1 But Douglas also believed that only direct prohibi-
tion could be effective in certain situations (for example, theseparation of commercial from investment banking under the
Glass-Steagall Act).142
Seeking to encourage "the development of a social mind-edness. among business men and their legal advisers,"'143
Douglas's attention, however, focused not on federal regula-
tion but on corporate law. He wanted to make the board inde-pendent of management. While Berle and Means's analysis fo-cused on corporate power, particularly the power of the con-
trol group to manipulate the market, Douglas's main concernwas management's control of the board, which, he believed,
was at the root of the problems of the 1920s.144
As Douglas saw it, the purpose of the board of directors
was to protect shareholders from management. He stressed
the need to guarantee that directors would not be "called in bythe managers," drawn from the managers, or be subordinate
to the managers in any way. In short, Douglas wanted to take"control or dominance of the board away from the executive
137. William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HLv. L. REv. 1305,1306 (1934).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1323.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1324-25.
143. Id. at 1307.
144. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 17.
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management.1 45 As he concluded, independent directors,
"the representatives of the stockholders, would be there, not
for the purpose of managing the enterprise, but with the ob-
ject of supervising those who do and of formulating the gen-
eral commercial and financial policies under which the busi-
ness is to be conducted." 146
In short, while the executives were to manage the corpo-
ration, the independent board of directors was assigned the
task of setting the corporation's policies and agenda and mon-
itoring the executives, lest they abuse their managerial power
to benefit themselves or the control group. Douglas conceded
that the independent directors "would not always be in a posi-
tion to know the details of the business in such a way as to
satisfy the standards which the Securities Act, for example, im-
poses on them."147 But, he stressed, "they would be in a posi-
tion of dominance and power to serve the stockholders effec-
tively." 148 In fact, Douglas believed that the independent direc-
tors should be elected from among the shareholders. 149
In an address delivered five years after the publication of
Directors Who Do Not Direct, Douglas went even further, sug-
gesting that outside, independent directors should be "paid
for their work in proportion to the actual contributions made
by them.' 50 Pay, he suggested, would go a long way toward the
creation of a professional director. 15 1 It would allow outside,
independent directors to protect the interests of the small
stockholder as well as the community. "Since the beginning of
corporate history-and particularly since corporations began
to turn to the public for their funds," Douglas explained, "it
has been recognized that the interests of the shareholders
could not be adequately served by management alone.... The
check of a board of vigilant, well-informed directors is needed
to assure that management is always loyal, honest, and pru-
dent."1 52




149. Id. at 1314-15.
150. William 0. Douglas, Corporation Directors, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE,
supra note 98, at 47.
151. Id. at 52-53.
152. Id. at 50.
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Lest he be misunderstood, Douglas emphasized that cor-porate powers were powers in trust. As he put it, "directors aretrustees by virtue of business ethics as well as law, and the pow-
ers which they exercise are powers in trust."'1 5 3 "The paid di-rector," he similarly pointed out in 1939, "would revive and
strengthen the tradition of trusteeship.... In a larger sense,he would not be so much a paid director or a professional di-rector as a public director, representing not only the present
but the potential stockholder, and representing the general
public as well.' 54
In the end, while Douglas's focus was not corporate power
but corporate internal hierarchies, he, like Berle, saw no con-tradiction between the directors' role as trustees for the com-
munity and their role as representatives of the shareholders.Douglas's and Berle's writings focused on the need to tameand constrain those in control, whether large investors ormanagement. Demanding that corporations act as trustees for
the community and that directors represent the interests ofthe shareholders were thus complementary requirements.
Douglas's Directors Who Do Not Direct concluded bystressing the need to develop "adequate administrative con-trols so that the domain of regulation will be neither wholly inthe courts nor largely ex post facto."'155 Douglas wanted to see
the development of a professional managerial class, "skilled inthe technique of business, the art of law, and the skill of gov-
ernment."1 56 Such a class, he believed, could monitor corpora-tions so as to align the interests of the shareholders with theinterests of the public-"so that the profit motive will be ar-
ticulated with the public good" and the investor assured "more
protection against the malpractices of management."' 57
Berle's and Douglas's arguments did not stimulate a con-tinuing scholarly debate about the role or legal status of theboard of directors. The policies of the New Deal seriously cir-
153. Douglas, supra note 137, at 1322. See also Douglas's decision in Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). ("A director is a fiduciary. So is a domi-nant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are
powers in trust."). While Pepper examined the duty of loyalty, Douglasseemed to have meant his statement to have broader applicability.
154. Douglas, supra note 150, at 53.
155. Douglas, supra note 157, at 1328.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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cumscribed the corporation's powers. The Securities Acts reg-
ulated the corporation's dealings with its shareholders as well
as its creditors, new federal labor laws regulated the corpora-
tion's relations with its employees, and antitrust laws affected
the corporation's behavior toward consumers and suppliers. 58
Concerns about the corporation's external power rapidly dissi-
pated while legal scholarship about corporate internal hierar-
chies focused on the board's control of the proxy machinery
and its duty of loyalty. 159
At the same time, however, the idea that directors were
representatives of the shareholders significantly influenced
state corporate law, specifically developments relating to the
shareholders' ability to sue directors for breaches of their fidu-
ciary obligations. As the following sections explain, viewing di-
rectors as representatives substantiated the courts' growing
deference to directors' expertise and discretion. Ironically,just
as the notion that directors were representatives of the share-
holders was disassociated from the idea that they were trustees
for the community, the courts' deferential approach paved the
road for the erosion of directors' liabilities toward their corpo-
rations and their shareholders. I start, however, by using the
early 1940s developments in securities regulation to illustrate
the rise of democracy as a legitimating concept. This is the
backdrop for the developments that will be discussed in the
following section.
B. Democracy as a Foundational Concept:
The Shareholder Proposal Rule
The main actors in the SEC believed that its role was to
promote capitalism. They thought government planning was
required to guarantee the financial stability that was necessary
to sustain capitalism. They presumed that the SEC would both"encourage rational organization within private groups and
between private groups in order to achieve that stability," and
158. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1688 (1988). See also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The
Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARv. L.
REx'. 917 (1941) (discussing the impact of the New Deal legislation on the
relationship between management and security holders).
159. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 17.
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eliminate those market practices that threatened it.160 Inshort, the SEC "was both policeman and promoter; a vehiclefor reform and a shield against more violent change." 161
The business community was initially rather troubled bythe liability clauses of the 1933 Act, which imposed civil liabil-
ity on corporations and their officers for fraud and for mis-
statements in the registration statement.162 But by the early1940s, it, too, came to believe that "the law, effectively en-
forced, assisted financial operations by policing marginal ele-ments within the industry and by promoting minimum stan-
dards of disclosure." 163 As more businessmen joined the gov-
ernment's war efforts, their influence grew. Gradually, it alsobecame apparent that the SEC was not against corporations or
"the profit motive." 164 In fact, it seemed that the commission-
ers and staff members saw the SEC as "an extension of business
enterprise."'16 5 Between 1934 and 1940, the Commission,"utilizing full disclosure, investigations, stop orders, stock ex-change surveillance, and participation in utility organization,
only reduced opportunities for corporate theft and restricted
the methods by which individuals, while inflicting pecuniarydamage upon one another, could derange the entire econ-
omy."1 66
Meanwhile, the number of individual shareholders con-tinued to rise. By 1934, the House Report on the Securities
Exchange bill estimated that more than 10 million individuals
owned stocks or bonds, and that "over one fifth of all the cor-porate stock outstanding in the country [was] held by individ-
uals with net incomes of less than $5,000 [$79,289.23 in 2007dollars] a year."' 67 In addition, it noted that more than 15 mil-
lion individuals held insurance policies, more than 13 millionhad "saving accounts in mutual savings banks" and at least 25million had "deposits in national and State banks and trust
160. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 179-
80 (1970).
161. Id. at 180.
162. DE BEDTS, supra note 92, at 50.
163. PAMRSH, supra note 160, at 229.
164. Id. at 231.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 232.
167. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 3 (1934).
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companies-which [were] in turn large holders of corporate
stocks and bonds."'1 68
In this atmosphere, reformers' attention shifted from cor-
porate power to corporate hierarchies, specifically to the rela-
tionship between shareholders, managers, and directors. For
one thing, in 1943, the SEC adopted the shareholder proposal
rule to encourage shareholder participation in corporate af-
fairs (or shareholder democracy). The rule required the board
of directors to include (albeit within limits) proposals from
shareholders in its proxy solicitation. As Milton Freeman, the
draftsman of the rule, explained, the SEC envisioned as the
principal beneficiary of the rule the small shareholder who
treated her investment as a long-term investment. In a world
growingly concerned about the ability of American democracy
to resist totalitarianism, SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell and his
colleagues wanted to protect the individual shareholder
against the corporation's management. The directors, viewed
as the shareholders' representatives (or fiduciaries), were en-
trusted with the task of mediating the conflict between man-
agement and shareholders. 169
The shareholder proposal rule has had a long and com-
plex history and today its potential force has been significantly
eroded.170 In 1947, however, the Third Circuit embraced its
drafters' ideals. In SEC v. Transamerica, a case that established
the power of the SEC to determine which shareholder propos-
als were "proper subjects" for inclusion in a corporation's
proxy statement, the court proclaimed that the shareholder
proposal rule (and proxy rules more broadly) were a means of
reminding a corporation's executives that a "corporation is
run for the benefit of its stockholders and not for that of its
managers." 171
Stronger endorsements came in the 1950s from propo-
nents of shareholder democracy. For example, David Bayne
announced that "the failure of democracy within the modern
American corporation is the failure of democracy pro tanto in
168. Id. at 3-4.
169. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1547-53.
170. Id. at 1554-60, 1565-73.
171. SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3rd Cir. 1947).
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our culture," 172 while Frank Emerson and Franklin Latcham
concluded that the shareholder proposal rule reflected "the
right of a minority to express itself and have an exchange of
ideas-all in a corporate context-but close to a fundamental
freedom." 173
The interest in shareholder democracy mirrored what
Morton Horwitz has labeled "the emergence of democracy as a
basic concept in American constitutional law" during the early
1940s. 174 Horwitz traces this phenomenon to the personal
and professional impact that the barbarities of totalitarianism
in Europe had on American social scientists. Having devoted
the early decades of the twentieth century to challenging abso-
lutist theories in law, politics, and morals, these social scientists
were left to wonder why America had been spared the ravages
of European dictatorship. Political and legal theorists begin-
ning in the late 1930s thus struggled to explain the contrast
between democratic and non-democratic societies. As Horwitz
notes, "this new obsession with democratic theory was de-
signed to show how America had managed to avoid suc-
cumbing to European totalitarianism. '"175
Proponents of the shareholder proposal rule and share-
holder participation, more broadly, wanted to give sharehold-
ers a more direct way to influence corporate affairs. They envi-
sioned the annual meeting as an exercise in participatory de-
mocracy. However, as I have previously argued, "by protecting
172. David C. Bayne, S.J., The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET.
L.J. 575 (1956-57).
173. FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOC-
RACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 117 (1954).
174. Morton Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme
Court Found Democracy-A Computer Study, 14 QUINNiPLAC L. REV. 1, 28 (1994).
175. Id. at 28-29 (1994). On the emergence of democracy as a fundamen-
tal constitutional principle during the war years, see also Morton J. Horwitz,
Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamental-
ism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 58-65 (1993); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS
OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE
(1973). For ajudicial endorsement of the relationship between corporations
and American democracy, see A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581,
586 (N.J. 1953) (noting the contributions of corporations to the nationalwelfare and success during World War I, the Depression, and World War II,
and stressing that corporations could play an important role in sustaining
American democracy during the Cold War by making contributions to aca-
demic institutions).
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University Law School
[Vol. 5:63
EVOLUTION OF DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
the rights of individual shareholders to participate in their cor-
porations annual meetings," these reformers "hoped not only
to constrain the board but also to legitimate its power to run
the corporation." 176 Such hopes sat well with the ideology of
managerialism that dominated corporate law at least through
the 1960s. Managerialists entrusted corporate managers to run
the corporation without much interference from the share-
holders. Moreover, such hopes reflected the influence of a dif-
ferent ideal of democracy that prevailed in the mid century
discussions about the role of the board of directors, that is, the
ideal of representative democracy. In 1931, for example, an
article in the Wall Street Journal noted that:
Corporate administration is in theory an example of
strictly representative government. Stockholders are
supposed to elect directors who are responsible for
the general conduct of the enterprise. The directors'
task is to choose managers whose business is to exe-
cute the general policies laid down by the directors to
whom they are primarily responsible for the general
conduct of the enterprise. If they do not perform it is
the directors' duty to remove them. If the directors
do not perform, it is the stockholders' right to re-
move them .... Representative government and not
direct democracy is the theory.177
While the idea that corporate democracy was a represen-
tative democracy floated earlier in the twentieth century, it be-
came more pronounced beginning in the mid 1930s. By the
early 1940s, as more shareholders attempted to use the deriva-
tive suit to challenge directors' actions178 (and perhaps also as
a backlash against the ideas of shareholder democracy), the
courts (with New York courts in a leading role) drew on the
ideal of representative democracy to interpret the business
judgment rule so as to limit the shareholders' ability to chal-
lenge directors' actions. Viewing the rule as a rule of defer-
176. Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1512-13.
177. Thomas F. Woodlock, Careless Owners: How Shall the Supreme Inertia of
the American Stockholder Be Overcome, WALL ST.J., April 22, 1931.
178. On the history of derivative suits, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Gen-
tleman's Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins of Restrictions on Stockholder Litigation
(Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 44,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=321
680.
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ence to directors' expert opinion, New York courts expanded
its scope to give more discretion to directors (and executives)
to attend to the affairs of the corporation without interference
from the shareholders.
Like Berle and Douglas, mid century progressive corpo-
rate law scholars typically believed that directors should re-
present the interests of the shareholders and the community
at large-that the ideal of representative democracy would
constrain abuses of corporate power without limiting the cor-
porations' benefits for the economy. 179 Their understanding
of the business judgment rule was grounded in a strong en-
dorsement of bureaucratic expertise. 180 But the mid century's
vision of directors as representatives helped justify absolute
deference to the board's discretion. Moreover, as I argue in
the fourth part of this article, beginning in the 1970s, the idea
that directors were mediators between shareholders' interests
and managerial control gradually led to the description of di-
rectors as agents of the shareholders whose role was to moni-
tor the executives. In this context, the business judgment rule
179. Abram Chayes's 1960 article, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of
Law, is a good example of this position. Chayes admitted that prior to the
emergence of the modern public corporation, "the shareholders were the
electorate, [and] the directors the legislatures, enacting general policies and
committing them to the officers for execution." Abram Chayes, The Modern
Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETv 25,
39 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960). But he argued that in the twentieth cen-
tury, while the analogy between corporate management and representative
democracy remained the same, the conception of membership (or electo-
rate) had to be expanded to include "all those having a relation of sufficient
intimacy with the corporation or subject to its power in a sufficiently special-
ized way." Id. at 41. "The thrust of the present argument," he noted, "sug-
gests that the internal structure of the corporation can also be fruitfully seen
as a federation of associational groupings." Id. at 45. For Chayes, as for other
progressive corporate law scholars in the 1960s (a minority position at that
point), representative democracy was the foundation for a corporate struc-
ture that could "assure more responsible exercise of power"; it was "the insti-
tutional structure of the modern corporation." Id. at 39.
180. See similarly Frug, supra note 59, at 1320-22. It is interesting to note
that earlier cases affirming deference to the corporation's decision-making
body often involved minority shareholders objecting to the majority share-
holders' actions. In such a context, judicial deference was deference to
majoritarian rule rather than to expert opinion. See, e.g., Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co. 25 N.E. 201, 202 (N.Y. 1890) ("[T]he court would not be
justified in interfering even in doubtful cases, where the action of the major-
ity might be susceptible of different construction.").
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gained a force of its own. Rather than a rule grounded in the
idea of representative democracy and the need to protect di-
rectors' discretion, it became a means of legitimating the di-
rectors' late twentieth century rather limited role and limited,
if any, liability.181
C. The Representative Director in Court and the Modem
Business Judgment Rule
In a provocative 1960 article entitled The Statutory Require-
ment of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, Robert A.
Kessler concluded that in a majority ofjurisdictions, the board
of directors was regarded as "a kind of a group of Platonic
guardians whose right to rule was a legislative mandate."1 82 Ac-
cordingly, shareholders could not "give orders to the directors,
or act for the corporation, unless by unanimous vote or agree-
ment." 183 As Kessler pointedly put it:
Although the cases do not make it express, they indi-
cate that the status of the board of directors is analo-
gous to that of a legislative body under a "delegative"
theory of democratic government. The directors have
been held to be the "representatives" of the entire
body of shareholders and hence not subject to the
dictates of even a majority of their "constituents," the
shareholders. Their decisions are required to be
made at a board meeting, at which they may not be
represented by proxy, although each director individ-
ually consents to the proposed action. Such a re-
181. Stephen Bainbridge draws a similar distinction between the modern
trend to view the business judgment rule as a standard of liability and the
idea that the business judgment rule is a doctrine of abstention. Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv.
83, 88-102 (2004). See also Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care:
Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule,
62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 594 (1983) (noting that while the business judgment
rule "began as an adjunct to duty of care standards designed to protect direc-
tors' decisions against hindsight evaluation when appropriate diligence had
been exercised, [it] has enveloped the primary inquiry"); Lyman Johnson,
The Modest BusinessJudgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625, 633 (2000) (distinguish-
ing between the business judgment rule-"a policy of judicial review" and the
duty of care-"a legal standard which specifies the manner in which direc-
tors must discharge their duties").
182. Kessler, supra note 10, at 697.
183. Id. at 700.
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quirement can be justified only on the ground that
the board of directors is a deliberative body of "the
elect," analogous to the conception held by the
founding fathers for the United States Senate.184
The leading jurisdiction was New York where cases in the
1930s typically demonstrated "respect for the board of direc-
tors as an inviolable institution" with whose actions the share-
holders could not intervene. 185 Take, for example, McQuade v.
Stoneham, a case involving an agreement between a majority of
the shareholders of the National Exhibition Company to en-
sure that all three of them continued to serve as directors and
officers and to receive a set amount of salary, or dividends,
from the corporation. Writing for the majority, Judge Pound
of the New York Court of Appeals declared the agreement
void. As he explained: "the stockholders may not, by agree-
ment among themselves, control the directors in the exercise
of the judgment vested in them by virtue of their office to elect
officers and fix salaries.... Directors may not by agreements
entered into as stockholders abrogate their independent judg-
ment." 86
Beyond their refusal to allow shareholders to control the
board (even in closely held corporation), courts were also dis-
inclined to evaluate directors' decisions. Since the turn of the
twentieth century, New York courts expanded the nineteenth-
century rule that exempted directors from liability for honest
mistakes1 87 to include all matters entrusted to the directors'
discretion. 81 For example, in 1914, Judge Cardozo wrote that
mere disagreement about the expediency of particular transac-
tions was not a reason for "the court... to revise the judgment
184. Id. at 701.
185. Id. at 698.
186. McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (N.Y. 1932). According to
Kessler, the only exception to this rule was Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641
(N.Y. 1936), which involved a closely held corporation in which the only two
shareholders were the officers and directors of the corporation. Kessler,
supra note 10, at 698.
187. On the earlier articulation of the business judgment rule, see supra
note 20.
188. Although some courts went in the opposite direction and limited the
exemption for honest mistakes. See Rohrlich, supra note 81, at 1191.
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of the directors, and substitute its conclusion for theirs."18 9 In
a similar manner, in 1931, in City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v.
Hewitt Realty Co., a case involving a request to compel directors
to declare dividends, the New York Court of Appeals drew a
distinction between situations where the directors breached
their trust, or acted in bad faith, or engaged in fraud, which
warranted the court's intervention, and "questions of expedi-
ency" which the courts should not evaluate as "such questions
are confided by the Legislature in the directors." 190
Yet, while the courts protected the directors' discretion,
they continued, through the early 1940s, to rely on heightened
directors' duties to protect the corporation and its sharehold-
ers from abuse of such discretion. Directors were exempt from
liability "for mere mistakes and errors of judgment," but re-
quired to exercise "proper care, skill, and diligence."'' In
fact, the conclusion of a 1942 article suggested that directors'
duties had not changed much since Hun v. Cary. According to
the author, "directors are not exonerated in the exercise of
even a disinterested business judgment if they have been care-
less-have failed to exercise the prudence and degree of care
which would be exercised in the circumstances by a reasonable
man protecting his own interests." 19 2 Kessler, too, argued that
the view that directors were representatives corresponded to
"higher responsibilities, just as Platonic 'guardians' would be:
189. Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
For a more elaborate, and often quoted, description of the rule, see Pollitz v.
Wabash R.R. Co. 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912) ("Questions of policy of man-
agement, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, law-
ful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate interests, are left
solely to [the directors'] honest and unselfish decision, for their powers
therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of
them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not be
questioned, although the results show that what they did was unwise or inex-
pedient.").
190. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 177 N.E. 309, 311
(N.Y. 1931).
191. Wangrow v. Wangrow, 207 N.Y.S. 132, 136 (App. Div. 1924).
192. Ralph M. Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors,
40 MICH. L. REv. 1125, 1142 (1942). See also id. at 1142-48 (citing cases where
courts have found directors negligent); Rohrlich, supra note 81, at 1190
(noting that "[t]he tendency towards holding directors liable for negligent
mismanagement had been a progressive one for some years, and the New
Deal statutes and the recent cases carry it forward.").
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They are bound by fiduciary duties to the corporation, if not
necessarily to his shareholders." 193
Such general statements neglected to recognize, however,
the minute but significant changes that culminated in the
1940s with respect to the duty of care and the business judg-
ment rule. Take, for example, Litwin v. Allen, a case involving
allegations of breaches of the duty of loyalty as well as negli-
gence. Justice Shientag of the Supreme Court of New York,
Special Term, seemed unequivocal. First, he explained that "a
director owes loyalty and allegiance to the company-a loyalty
that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action
by no consideration other than the welfare of the corpora-
tion." 194 Moreover, Shientag stressed that loyalty was not
enough. Rather, "in the discharge of his duties a director
must, of course, act honestly and in good faith, but that is not
enough. He must also exercise some degree of skill and pru-
dence and diligence."195 Specifically, Shientag explained that
while directors were not liable for "errors of judgment or for
mistakes while acting with reasonable skill and prudence,"
they were "liable for negligence in the performance of their
duties."1 9 6
At the same time, however, Shientag chose to tweak the
standard of care applicable to directors' actions. As Shientag
saw it, his task in Litwin was to balance the need to protect the
directors' discretion with the need to protect the corporation
and its shareholders. He drew the balance by tailoring what he
viewed as the appropriate standard of care. Specifically, he ar-
ticulated a standard of care that gave directors more leeway
than did earlier cases. Shientag required directors to act as
prudent persons, or prudent directors, in similar circum-
stances (not the stricter standard mentioned above of the pru-
dent person managing his own affairs). As Shientag put it:
It has been said that a director is required to conduct
the business of the corporation with the same degree
193. Kessler, supra note 10, at 701. Kessler further noted that the direc-
tors' fiduciary duty to the corporation was "a proposition so universally ac-
cepted as not to require citation of authority." Id. at 701 n.28.
194. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
195. Id. at 677-78.
196. Id. at 678. In support of this statement, Shientag cited Railroad Co. v.
Lockwood (1873), which was discussed in the second part of this article. See
supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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of fidelity and care as an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise in the management of his own affairs
of like magnitude and importance. General rules,
however, are not altogether helpful. In the last analy-
sis, whether or not a director has discharged his duty,
whether or not he has been negligent, depends upon
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the
kind of corporation involved, its size and financial re-
sources, the magnitude of the transaction, and the
immediacy of the problem presented. A director is
called upon "to bestow the care and skill" which the
situation demands. 197
197. Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 678. While Shientag did not reject the term"prudent person," his analysis suggests that he saw the standard as equivalent
to the standard of the prudent director in similar circumstances. As he put
it, "[u] ndoubtedly, a director of a bank is held to stricter accountability than
the director of an ordinary business corporation. A director of a bank is
entrusted with the funds of depositors, and the stockholders look to him for
protection from the imposition of personal liability. But clairvoyance is not
required even of a bank director. The law recognizes that the most conserva-
tive director is not infallible, and that he will make mistakes, but if he uses
that degree of care ordinarily exercised by prudent bankers he will be ab-
solved from liability although his opinion may turn out to have been mis-
taken and his judgment faulty." Id. (citation omitted) In this respect, it is
also important to note that Shientag's decision in Litwin reflected a gradual
development. In the 1910s and 1920s, NewYork courts required directors to
act as prudent persons would act in the conduct of their affairs. See, e.g., Tri-
Bullion Smelting & Dev. v. Curtis, 174 N.Y.S. 830, 839 (App. Div. 1919)
("[D]irectors ... were bound to use the same degree of care and vigilance in
the performance of their duties as a reasonably prudent and careful man
would use in the conduct of his business"); Bown v. Ramsdell, 237 N.Y.S.
573, 576 (App. Div. 1929) ("[D]irectors [are] personally answerable for
losses resulting from ordinary neglect in their official duties; ordinary neg-
lect being understood to be the omission of that care which every man of
common prudence takes of his own concerns."). By the early 1930s, New
York courts changed the standard from the prudent person to the prudent
businessperson. See, e.g., Walker v. Man, 253 N.Y.S. 458, 462 (Sup. Ct. 1931)
(holding that directors are "bound generally to use every effort that a pru-
dent business man would use in supervising his own affairs"); Simon v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ("It is ele-
mentary that directors owe a corporation the duty to exercise reasonable
care in managing its affairs; that is, the same degree of care which a business
man of ordinary prudence generally exercises in the management of his own
affairs. If the directors fail to use such care, they are liable to the corporation
for damages.").
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Shientag's approach of tweaking the standard of liability
would have continued to require a careful analysis of the direc-
tors' actions in each case. More devastating to the possibility of
imposing liability on directors was the 1940s expansion of the
business judgment rule. Perhaps due to their concerns about
shareholders' growing employment of the derivative suit1 98 or
about securities regulation that granted shareholders more
power, such as the shareholder proposal rule, and perhaps
due to their embrace of managerialism, the New York courts
chose to add new exemptions to directors' liability. Their ef-
forts were informed by the vision of directors as representa-
tives; their success complemented it.
Specifically, courts refrained from evaluating directors'
actions in matters entrusted to their discretion even when the
directors' errors were gross. Take as one example Everett v.
Phillips, a suit by a minority shareholder of Empire Power Cor-
poration to compel directors sitting both on its board and on
the board of Long Island Lighting Company to demand pay-
ment of indebtedness from the lighting company to the power
company. In determining that the directors did not violate
their trust to the power company or its shareholders, the court
noted that not merely innocent mistakes, which prudent per-
sons might make, but also gross mistakes were protected from
ex-post intervention by the courts:
Power of control carries with it a trust or duty to exer-
cise that power faithfully to promote the corporate
interests, and the courts of this State will insist upon
scrupulous performance of that duty. Yet, however
high may be the standard of fidelity to duty which the
court may exact, errors of judgment by directors do
not alone suffice to demonstrate lack of fidelity. That
is true even though the errors may be so gross that
they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors
to manage the corporate affairs. 199
198. See Carson, supra note 192, at 1126, 1158-60.
199. Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 18, 19-20 (N.Y. 1942). While Everett in-
volved a duty of loyalty claim, the statement quoted above applied both to
duty of loyalty and duty of care situations. See also Rous v. Carlisle, 26
N.Y.S.2d 197, 200 (App. Div. 1941) ("If a director exercises his business judg-
ment in good faith on the information before him, he may not be called to
account through the judicial process, even though he may have erred in his
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University Law School
[Vol. 5:63
EVOLUTION OF DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
Gradually, exemptions to directors' liability were en-
croaching upon the standard of care applicable to their ac-
tions. As Shientag noted in 1944, "although the concept of 're-
sponsibility' is firmly fixed in the law, it is only in a most
unusualand extraordinary case that directors are held liable
for negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or
personal interest."200
As illustrated by his decision in Casey v. Woodruff a case
involving a suit to recover costs from corporate directors for
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Shientag wanted to resurrect whatever was left of the duty of
care. "The fundamental concept of negligence does not vary,"
he wrote, "whether it is applied to the case of a simple per-
sonal injury action or to liability of directors in the manage-
ment of the affairs of their corporation. '" 20 1 In both situations,
Shientag stressed, "the law requires the use of judgment, the
judgment of ordinary prudence. '20 2 Turning to the business
judgment rule, he explained:
The question is frequently asked, how does the oper-
ation of the so-called "business judgment rule" tie in
with the concept of negligence? There is no conflict
between the two. When courts say that they will not
interfere in matters of business judgment, it is pre-
supposed that judgment-reasonable diligence-has
in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his
eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of
the business of the corporation and have it said that
he is exercising business judgment. Courts have prop-
erly decided to give directors a wide latitude in the
management of the affairs of a corporation provided
always that judgment, and that means an honest, un-
biased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them.20 3
Despite attempts to keep the duty of care alive, the busi-
ness judgment rule gained a force of its own. Rather than a
judgment. It is necessary, therefore, for the stockholder to allege facts show-
ing more than error in business judgment.").
200. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
201. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
202. Id.
203. Id. It should be noted that Shientag held that the directors in this
case were not negligent.
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rule grounded in the view that directors were representatives
of the shareholders and, as such, should have broad discretion
to manage the corporation, it became a means of exempting
directors from liability, of changing the standard of liability ap-plicable to their actions.204 Not only honest mistakes but all
actions, unless they were fraudulent or tainted with a conflictof interest, were exempt from liability. 205 The fourth part ofthis article explores the magnitude of this transformation. Be-
forehand, it is important briefly to explore how these 1940s
changes affected not only the directors' liability but also thecourts' vision of the directors' role. Gradually, the ideal of di-
rectors as representatives (and representative democracy more
broadly) began to lose its force.
Take, Bayer v. Beran, a case involving a derivative suitbrought by the shareholders of the Celanese Corporation ofAmerica against their directors for alleged breaches of their
fiduciary duties. These allegations focused on the directors'
approval of a radio advertising campaign in which the presi-dent's wife, a professional opera singer, was sometimes fea-tured. The shareholders argued, first, that the directors were
negligent in approving the campaign and, second, that thecampaign was engaged in to further the career of the presi-
dent's wife.206
Shientag began his discussion by stressing the importance
of the derivative suit. The New York Chamber of Commerce
expressed growing dissatisfaction with derivative suits in theearly 1940s, convincing the New York legislature to pass a law
204. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 812-13(1976). ("The directors' room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate
forum for thrashing out purely business questions which will have an impacton profits, market prices, competitive situations, or tax advantages.... It isnot enough to allege, as plaintiffs do here, that the directors made an impru-dent decision, which did not capitalize on the possibility of using a potentialcapital loss to offset capital gains. More than imprudence or mistaken judg-
ment must be shown.").
205. For an interesting analysis of the impact of the emergence of themodem business judgment rule on the duty of loyalty, see NELSON, supra note2, at 297 (arguing that "the reification of the business judgment rule [in theearly 1940s] probably gave judges a better basis than they previously pos-sessed for declining to enforce the duty of loyalty ... and instead, decidingcases 'on the practical basis' that entrepreneurs should be left free to man-
age corporations efficiently. .. ).
206. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 7 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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that acutely circumscribed the ability of shareholders to pur-
sue these suitS.207 Shientag's response was short and direct. His
decision began with the following:
Despite abuses that have developed in connection
with the derivative stockholders' suit, abuses which
should be dealt with promptly and effectively, it must
be remembered that such an action is, at present, the
only civil remedy that stockholders have for breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of those entrusted with the
management and direction of their corporations. We
cannot therefore allow the prevailing mood of justifi-
able dissatisfaction with some of the temporary inci-
dents of such suits to cause us to lose sight of certain
deep-rooted, traditional concepts of the obligations
of directors to their corporation and its stockhold-
ers. 208
But Shientag's analysis of the directors' fiduciary duties
took away whatever procedural protection he offered to the
shareholders. First, Shientag addressed the appropriate obliga-
tions of directors to the corporation and its shareholders. "Di-
rectors of a business corporation are not trustees and are not
held to strict accountability as such," Shientag proclaimed.
Rather, as he put it, "directors are agents; they are fiduciaries."
209 As such, they had two obligations: "responsibility and loy-
alty." 210 As he noted in Litwin, the level of care and diligence
required of directors as agents or fiduciaries was "propor-
tioned to the occasion. '211
Interestingly, Shientag labeled directors agents even
though he viewed their status as analogous to the status of
democratically elected representatives. He stressed that the
power to manage the corporation was vested in the board and
that the judicial role was to discourage shareholders from in-
terfering with the directors' "free and independent judg-
ment. ' 212 (As discussed in the first part of this article, if direc-
207. See Mitchell, supra note 178.
208. Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5.
209. Id. at 5.
210. Id. at 2.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 6.
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tors were agents of the shareholders, the latter, as principals,
would determine the scope of their power.213 )
Beyond labels, Shientag also changed the requirements
that the description of directors as representatives of the
shareholders implied. With a nod to the general rule that di-rectors as agents of the stockholders (and, more accurately, as
their representatives) "are given by law no power to act exceptas a board,"' 214 Shientag was willing to validate corporate deci-
sions that did not follow this requirement. As he put it, "thefailure to observe the formal requirements is by no means fa-
tal."2 15 In Bayer, despite the fact that no formal meeting washeld to approve the advertising campaign prior to its introduc-
tion, Shientag proclaimed that the directors fulfilled their care
and diligence responsibilities. 216
A decade later, albeit in a different context, the Court ofAppeals of New York went even further in eroding the status of
directors as representatives. Auer v. Dressel was an action bystockholders to compel the corporation's president to call aspecial meeting, among other things, so that the shareholders
could vote on a resolution endorsing the conduct of Mr. Aueras president and requesting that he be reinstated. While the
selection of officers was within the realm of the directors' dis-
cretion, the court held that the shareholders could call a spe-cial meeting to express "their approval of Mr. Auer's conduct
as president and their demand that he be put back in that of-
fice." 217 "It would be preposterous," the court reiterated, "toleave the real owners of the corporate property at the mercy of
their agents."218
Judge Van Voorhis, in dissent, continued to endorse the
notion that the directors' status was analogous to the electo-rate in democratic governments. As he announced, the statuteprovides that "the business of a corporation shall be managed
by its board of directors. ' 219 Having been elected by the share-holders "for stated terms which have not expired," the board,
not the stockholders, had the power to appoint the officers of
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 10.
217. Matter of Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954).
218. Id. at 593 (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589 (1933)).
219. Id. at 595 (Van Voorhis J., dissenting).
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the corporation. Accordingly, "for the stockholders to vote on
the proposition would be an idle gesture. 220
Despite Van Voorhis's and similar critiques, the tides were
rapidly shifting. For purposes of allowing directors to act with-
out interference from the shareholders, the vision of directors
as representatives of the shareholders seemed to survive. But it
was supplemented by a new set of ideas that helped shield the
board from liability almost absolutely. As the fourth part of
this article explains, by the 1970s the emergence of a new eco-
nomic theory of the corporation, which recognized no inter-
nal power or hierarchy, gave rise to the idea that directors
were not representatives but mere agents of the shareholders.
As to the appropriate functions of directors as agents, the legal
and business communities converged on the monitoring
model of the board of directors. It rested on the assumption
that directors could only monitor the executives, and that in-
dependent directors were best suited for this task. With a lim-
ited role came very limited, if any, liability. By the mid 1980s,
the Delaware courts collapsed the duty of care into the busi-
ness judgment rule; they declared that the business judgment
rule altered the standard of care from negligence to gross neg-
ligence and made gross negligence a prerequisite for rebut-
ting the presumption of the business judgment rule. Within a
few years, these ideas were strongly cemented into U.S. corpo-
rate law.
IV.
THE BOARD AT CENTURY'S END, ONCE REMOVED:
DIRECTORS AS LIMITED AGENTS
A. A New Theory of the Firm
Beginning in the late 1930s and continuing until the mid
1970s, Keynesian economics gained wide acceptance among
American scholars. Predicated upon the belief that govern-
ments should not choose among competing, individual visions
of the public good, it helped legitimate a regulatory shift from"planning" to "accepting existing consumer preferences" and
220. Id. at 594.
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"manipulating aggregate demand."221 Both those who criti-
cized the early New Deal as only increasing the concentration
of power in a few hands and those who criticized it as increas-
ing government power found in the new consumer ideology a
point of convergence. The former wanted to expand the regu-
latory functions of the administrative state to protect consum-
ers and promote full production, while the latter wanted the
state only to redress "weaknesses and imbalances in the private
economy without directly confronting the internal workings of
capitalism"- to "manage the economy without managing the
institutions of the economy." 222
In the 1940s, with totalitarianism in Europe, and scholars'growing concerns about the relationship between statism and
tyranny, the compensatory, fiscal vision of the state, which en-
tailed only limited power, became the more appealing one. At
the same time, the economic boom produced by the war effortmade the need for regulation less urgent. The economy
seemed to do well without government interference. A vision
of a free market, corrected on rare occasions by the state's fis-
cal hand, began to dominate economic thought. 223
The growing academic faith in the power of economic
markets to produce and serve the common good opened a
door for the introduction of economics into corporate law.
Neo-classical economists, who thus far had focused their theo-rizing efforts on markets, turned to the corporation's internal
structure. Their new economic theory of the firm offered apicture of the corporation that fit the market-centered eco-
nomic policies of the postwar years. Rather than putting man-
agement hierarchies or the need to constrain corporate power
at the center of the corporate paradigm, the new economic
theory of the firm found a way around hierarchical power and
its consequent need for regulation. Drawing on
microeconomics, it painted a picture of the corporation as a
nexus of private, contractual relationships. This cleared the
way for presumably egalitarian economic markets to become
221. Alan Brinkley, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 85, 92, 98 (Steve Fraser & Gary
Gerstle eds., 1989).
222. Id. at 94, 87-97.
223. On these developments, see id. at 97-121; SANDEL, supra note 72, at250-73; ALAN BINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RE-
CESSION AND WAR 154-65 (1995).
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the relevant focal point.2 2 4 The corporation was a collection of
"disaggregated but interrelated transactions" among individu-
als or the convenient fiction of corporate entity in free and
efficient markets. 2 25
The new theory of the firm supported a shift of focus in
scholarly debates from questions of power, influence, sanc-
tions, and legitimacy to issues of cost reduction and profit
maximization. 226 Its proponents refrained the problems of
corporate power and hierarchies as the problem of the separa-
tion of ownership from control (or agency costs) and sought
to demonstrate how capital markets could eliminate the con-
cerns about efficiency associated with this separation. 227
Take, for example, Daniel Fischel's 1982 examination of
the corporate governance structure. Reiterating the new eco-
nomic theory of the firm, Fischel began his analysis by noting
that "[t]he publicly held corporation... is a type of firm that
facilitates the organization of production which is particularly
effective when a large amount of capital is required. '228 As he
elaborated:
Shareholders and bondholders provide firms [i.e.,
the corporation] with needed capital in exchange for
an expected rate of return generated by cash flows
from the firm's assets. Different groups provide other
factors of production: employees supply labor, man-
agers supply managerial talent necessary for coordi-
nating the various inputs, and suppliers supply
goods. 229
Having so described the corporation, Fischel stressed the
potential conflict of interest between shareholders, who
wanted to maximize the return on their investment, and man-
agers, who did not have a strong incentive to maximize the
corporate wealth because, unless they were also shareholders,
they did not capture the gains of such maximization. He fur-
224. William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisa4 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 416-20 (1989).
225. Id. at 420.
226. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1498 (1989).
227. Tsuk, supra note 76, at 212-15.
228. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1262 (1982).
229. Id.
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ther assessed different ways to reduce agency costs, including
direct monitoring by independent directors that could limit"non-wealth maximizing behavior by manager-agents '23 0 and
managerial contracts that could limit the divergence of inter-
ests. 231 But, according to Fischel, adopting different mecha-
nisms to reduce agency costs was unnecessary. Like other advo-
cates of the new theory of the firm, Fischel emphasized that
the market itself would best channel managerial power to act
to the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. As he
put it:
When a firm is profitable, the price of its shares will
be high relative to comparable firms that are less effi-
ciently run. This basic proposition has dramatic im-
plications for the incentives of corporate managers to
maximize the firm's profits. Since managers' com-
pensation typically is positively correlated with profit-
ability, they have strong incentives to operate effi-
ciently and keep stock prices high.... The product
and capital markets also constrain the divergence of
interests between managers and investors. A firm that
is inefficiently run will have a difficult time selling
goods and services on the same terms as more effi-
ciently run firms. Similarly, the poorly run firm will
be at a disadvantage in raising equity capital. Even if
the inefficient firm does not resort to the new equi-
ties market for needed capital, it still is at a disadvan-
tage when negotiating with other sources of capital
such as banks. In addition, if the price of a firm's
shares falls too low relative to what it would be under
superior management, an outsider may attempt to ac-
quire the firm by merger or tender offer and install
new managers. The operation of this market for cor-
porate control simultaneously gives managers of all
firms who wish to avoid a takeover an incentive to op-
erate efficiently and to keep share prices high and
230. Id. at 1263.
231. Id. at 1264.
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provides a mechanism for displacing inefficient man-
agers. 232
Fischel was writing at the front end of the 1980s hostile
takeovers. Within a couple of years, the Delaware courts were
faced with a series of cases dealing with managerial defensive
tactics that required them to determine their willingness to
embrace the market, especially the market for control, as a
means of taming corporate management. The courts' unequiv-
ocal answer was no. (It is important to note that, despite the
role that Delaware's legislature played in creating U.S. corpo-
rate law, the Delaware courts did not play a significant role in
developing the contours of the duty of care until the 1980s.
Indeed, the Delaware courts' claim to fame was their analysis
of the hostile tender-offer cases.) 233
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the seminal takeover
case, the Delaware Supreme Court drew upon the board's
"fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate en-
terprise" to create the power of the board to adopt defensive
tactics that would thwart hostile takeovers (and the market for
control) 234 As Justice Horsey put it four years later, in Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.:
Delaware law confers the management of the corpo-
rate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected
board representatives. .... That [fiduciary duty to
manage a corporate enterprise] may not be dele-
gated to the stockholders. Directors are not obliged
to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan
for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is
clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.2 35
232. Id. at 1263-64. On Fischel's views, see Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs
Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 325, 346-48 (1987).
233. See infra Part IV.D.
234. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The court enumerated several provisions
of the Delaware General Corporations Law as sources for the board's power
but none of these provisions was explicitly meant to address takeovers.
235. 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (citations omitted). For an intrigu-
ing analysis of Paramount see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and
Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV,. 1931, 1933 (1991) (arguing that "Paramount can
best be understood as a judgment that a self-regulating market, such as an
unbridled market in corporate control, threatens fundamental social values
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Six years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., the
Delaware Supreme Court empowered directors to fight all-
cash, all-shares premium tender offers and, for all practical
purposes, eliminated the market for control. 236 As the court
saw it, as long as a proxy contest was a possibility, even a re-
mote one, the market for control remained viable. 237
In short, just as the academic community was turning
away from the description of directors as Platonic masters, Del-
aware courts strongly embraced it, tweaking the market for
control in the context where it mattered most-the hostile
takeover context. 238 Yet, as the following sections elaborate,
while the Delaware courts seemed to continue to embrace the
1940s conception of representative democracy, they also
strongly endorsed one of the ideas that followed directly from
the new economic theory of the firm and that rejected the
conception of representative democracy altogether, namely,
the idea that directors were agents of their shareholders. In so
doing, the Delaware courts created dissonance within corpo-
rate law and helped pave the road for the ascendance of a par-
ticular model of the board-the monitoring model. The no-
tion of an independent monitoring board helped jurists evade
certain conceptual difficulties associated with the description
of directors as agents. As I conclude, it also legitimated the
courts' diminution of directors' liability almost to nothing.
B. Directors as Agents
Closely tied to the growing academic concern about the
separation of ownership from control, and following directly
such a loyalty, continuity, and community, and, that at the very least, take-
over activity needed to be slowed down.").
236. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
237. See id. at 1382-83. For a discussion of the concerns Unitrin raises with
respect to directors' fiduciary obligations, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Mergers and
Acquisitions: 'Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholders-
Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 511 (1997).
238. For a critique of these cases launched by an ardent advocate of the
new theory of the firm, see Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A
Reply to Chairman Cohen, 16 DuKE LJ. 231 (1967); Henry G. Manne, In Defense
of the Corporate Coup, 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 513 (1984). For an attempt to unify the
takeover doctrine (albeit prior to Unitrin) in terms of allocation of power
between directors, shareholders, and the courts, see Marcel Kahan, Para-
mount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeoverjurisprudence, 19 IoWA
J. CORP. L. 583 (1994).
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from the new theory of the firm, was the idea that managers
(directors and officers) were agents of the shareholders. As
this section explains, the theory of agency that proved to be
full of contradictions in the early twentieth century returned
in full force at the century's end.
Perhaps the best articulation of the late twentieth century
agency theory of the corporation was offered by Michael C.
Jensen and William H. Meckling in their 1976 article, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Struc-
ture. The article reintroduced the traditional rules of contracts
into the study of firms and organizations, focusing on "the be-
havioral implications of the property rights specified in the
contract between the owners and managers of the firm. 239
Jensen and Meckling began by defining the agency rela-
tionship as "a contract under which one or more persons (the
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision making authority to the agent." Every agency relation-
ship involved agency costs, including "the monitoring expend-
itures by the principal. the bonding expenditures by the
agent... [and] the residual loss." Having defined the general
parameters of their theory, Jensen and Meckling wrote that
"[s] ince the relationship between the stockholders and manag-
ers of the corporation fit the definition of a pure agency rela-
tionship, it should be no surprise to discover that the issues
associated with the 'separation of ownership and control' in
the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately asso-
ciated with the general problem of agency. 240
Writing about the economic concept of firms (rather than
the legal concept of corporations), Jensen and Meckling did
not distinguish between executives and directors. They
lumped them together as managers. But corporate legal schol-
ars were not troubled by such omission. Their application of
Jensen and Meckling's theory of the firm to corporate law had
a profound impact on the courts' understanding of the status
of the board of directors in the last decades of the twentieth
239. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976).
240. Id. at 309. See also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Problems and Residual Claims, 26J. OF L. & ECON. 327 (1983).
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century. As I elaborate below, the courts' acquiescence in the
idea that directors were agents of their shareholders helped
legitimate not only their deference to corporate directors but
also their erosion of directors' liability. 241
Blasius Industries, Inv. v. Atlas Corp., a case that involved a
conflict between Atlas's board and Atlas's largest shareholder,
Blasius, illustrates this point. In an attempt to prevent or at
least delay Blasius from placing a majority of new directors on
the board, Atlas's board increased its size by two and filled the
newly created directorships. 242 Blasius brought suit challeng-
ing this action. Written at the tail end of the hostile takeovers
decade, Chancellor Allen's decision began by reiterating the
rule adopted in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. As Allen ex-
plained:
A board may take certain steps... that have the effect
of defeating a threatened change in corporate con-
trol, when those steps are taken advisedly, in good
faith pursuit of a corporate interest, and are reasona-
ble in relation to a threat to legitimate corporate in-
terests posed by the proposed change in control.2 43
In other words, even when faced with a hostile takeover,
the corporation was managed under the direction of its board
of directors and the shareholders had no right to interfere
with the board's discretion. But, Allen went on, the directors'
power to respond to a hostile takeover, as any other power
they possessed, was conferred upon them "as the agents of the
shareholders." 244 Corporate law, Allen stressed, presumably re-
jecting the 1940s vision of directors, "does not create Platonic
masters." 245 The shareholders, as principals, could view issues
such as the one before the court differently than did the board
and "[i]f they do, or did, they are entitled to employ the mech-
anisms provided by the corporation law and the Atlas certifi-
cate of incorporation" to advance their views. 246 Moreover, the
241. On the benefits of treating officers, as distinguished from directors,
as agents, see Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. AND MARY L. REv'. 1597 (2005).
242. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. 1988).
243. Id. at 659.
244. Id. at 663.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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shareholders, in Allen's opinion, were entitled "to restrain
their agents, the board, from acting for the principal purpose
of thwarting that action. ' 247 Accordingly, the board's action in
this particular case "constituted an unintended violation of the
duty of loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders." 248
One would be mistaken, however, to assume that Allen's
decision in Blasius was meant fully to embrace the idea that
directors were agents of the shareholders. If such were the
case, directors would not be able to act without the explicit or,
at least, implied consent of their principals. But, while Allen
would not allow directors to affect the shareholders' ability to
elect their agents, he was fully content to permit directors to
prevent shareholders from selling their stock to a hostile bid-
der (a more meaningful action). 249 Indeed, the issue was one
of legitimacy. Allen used agency theory to legitimate the status
of directors as, ironically, Platonic masters. As he put it, the
"shareholder franchise" was "the ideological underpinning
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Allen's decision in Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, at 89-90 (July 14, 1989) ("[T]he financial vitality of
the corporation and the value of the company's shares is in the hands of the
directors and managers of the firm. The corporation law does not operate
on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm,
are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors,
not shareholders, are charged with the duty to manage the firm .... That
many, presumably most, shareholders would prefer the board to do other-
wise than it has done does not, in the circumstances of a challenge to this
type of transaction, in my opinion, afford a basis to interfere with the effectu-
ation of the board's business judgment"). See also Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to "Just
Say No, "67 U. CIN. L. Riv. 999, 1011-14 (1999) (noting the apparent incon-
sistencies between the Delaware courts' disempowerment of shareholders in
the hostile takeover cases and their approach in cases such as Blasius).
Thompson concludes that "Delaware has long preferred a corporate govern-
ance system that is very indirect. Directors, elected by the shareholders make
almost all corporate decisions, including those relating to takeovers. Share-
holders have a limited say by a limited ability to replace the directors. Just as
shareholder views about a takeover can be channeled away from a selling
decision and into a proxy decision, so can voting decisions be channeled
into an annual meeting or perhaps requiring action at two annual meetings
before shareholder decision-making can prevail. The growth in the role of
institutional investors as shareholders has not been enough to move Dela-
ware from its long-stated preference of indirect democracy." Id. at 1020. See
also the discussion supra ca. notes 234-37.
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upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests." 250
While admitting that the shareholders' vote had often been
dismissed "as a vestige or a ritual of little practical impor-
tance," Allen nonetheless stressed that
[a] decision by the board to act for the primary pur-
pose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder
vote inevitably involves the question who, as between
the principal and the agent, has authority with re-
spect to a matter of internal corporate govern-
ance .... Judicial review of such action involves a de-
termination of the legal and equitable obligations of
an agent towards his principal. This is not... a ques-
tion that a court may leave to the agent finally to de-
cide so long as he does so honestly and competently;
that is, it may not be left to the agent's business judg-
ment.25 1
Directors, in short, were neither trustees nor representa-
tives, but agents of the shareholders. Yet, the obligations de-
rived from their status as agents were limited to allowing share-
holders to exercise their voting power, a meaningless ritual at
best. As I argue in the following section, at least in part, the
monitoring model of the board, upon which the legal and bus-
iness communities converged in the early 1980s, helped make
this image of the directors as agents plausible. The monitoring
model rested on the twin assumptions that the directors' ac-
tual function was to monitor the executives and that indepen-
dent directors could best perform this function. While the
courts did not explicitly make the connection, I argue that the
independent directors, presumably without other ties to the
corporation, made the ideas that the shareholders actually
elected directors and thus that the directors were their agents
less fictitious. At the same time, the courts' reliance on the
independent directors' opinion helped them limit the liability
imposed on the board as a whole.
C. The Monitoring Board
The monitoring model of the board emerged during the
1970s, a crucial decade in the development of corporate gov-
250. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. 1988).
251. Id. at 659-60.
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ernance. Amidst social and political upheaval, public-interest
shareholder groups used the SEC's proxy and shareholder
proposal rules to voice their opposition to corporate practices
related to the Vietnam War as well as a wide array of "environ-
mental, occupational safety, and employment policies."252 At
the same time, institutional investors became major players in
corporate governance; by the end of 1978, they "owned 36.3%
of all common and preferred stock outstanding," raising new
questions about the control of corporate America.253 In addi-
tion, several corporate bankruptcies, including the sudden
and unexpected collapse of Penn Central, "the nation's largest
railroad company and sixth largest industrial corporation,"
raised grave doubts about "the performance of corporate
boards of directors."254 Corporate scandals involving illegal po-
litical contributions revealed during the Watergate investiga-
tion exacerbated such doubts. 255 The number of corporations
involved was so high that the SEC initiated a program that "al-
lowed a firm that had made questionable or illegal payments
to avoid an SEC enforcement action by conducting its own in-
vestigation of the payments." 256 Through 1981, almost four
hundred firms voluntarily disclosed making such payments
and SEC investigations found an additional sixty two firms to
have done so. 257
The corporate board was at the forefront of public and
academic discussions. 258 A variety of studies concluded that
the boards of directors of large and medium-sized corpora-
tions "had ceased to function as a meaningful check on the
corporation's chief executive officer" 259; they did not even
have much say in selecting the executives, as the proxy ma-
chinery was controlled by management. Outside directors
were ineffective. They were typically chosen from the same so-
cial networks as the top executives and sitting with the latter
on several boards; they were thus unlikely to challenge the ex-
252. Seligman, supra note 232, at 328.
253. Id. at 329.
254. Id. at 329-30.
255. Id. at 333-34.
256. Id. at 335.
257. Id.
258. As an example of this growing attention, see Symposium, Officers' and
Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1-178 (1972).
259. Seligman, supra note 232, at 330.
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ecutives. Finally, studies revealed that most boards did not
meet frequently enough to perform a meaningful role. 260
Several proposals for reform followed. Some wanted more
federal supervision and guidance. Former SEC Chairman Wil-
liam Cary proposed the enactment of federal "minimum stan-
dards" for officers and directors of firms of a certain size. 261 In
a similar manner, Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Selig-
man reintroduced the idea that firms of a certain income and
employee-base should be federally incorporated; the federal
statute was to include specific requirements regarding board
composition and the board's role. 262 More radically, Nader,
Green, and Seligman sought to revive the Progressive idea that
directors were trustees for the community and called for the
representation of different corporate constituencies on the
board. As Lawrence Mitchell writes, "the board remained as
the last, best hope against the increasing displacement of all
other interests by rampant managerialism. 263
Other proposals focused on the composition of the
board. Harvey Goldschmid suggested requiring boards to be
composed entirely of outside directors who would review the
executives' decisions.264 And Peter Drucker proposed creating
boards of "professional directors," "men or women of public
standing and proven competence who, as members of the
board, can be truly independent of management. '" 265
Lawyers and business groups similarly emphasized the im-
portance of the board's structure. In 1976 the American Bar
Association's Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Cor-
260. Id. at 330-32. See also Horsey, supra note 19, at 991; Mitchell, supra
note 9, at 22.
261. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
ware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-03 (1974). See also Cary & Harris, supra note 3, at
66 (suggesting higher standard of care for inside directors).
262. RALPH NADER ET AL, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). In 1976
and 1977 Congress held hearings "on the need for a new federal corporate
law," but ultimately the reforms embraced by the SEC were rather limited,
requiring corporations to have independent audit committees and better
corporate recordkeeping. Seligman, supra note 232, at 337-40. On the Pro-
gressive federal incorporation movement, see MITCHELL, supra note 69; Tsuk
Mitchell, supra note 73, at 1516-17.
263. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 19-20.
264. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections on
Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 15 (1973).
265. Horsey, supra note 19, at 991.
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poration, Banking and Business Law, published a Corporate Di-
rector's Guidebook.266 The Guidebook described directors as "over-
seers of the corporation and monitors of corporate manage-
ment." 267 So that the board could fulfill these tasks, the
Guidebook recommended that a significant number of outside
directors serve on the board and that inside directors be pro-
hibited from serving on the nominating, compensation, and
audit committees. 268 The Business Roundtable, "reflecting the
views of the heads of 180 corporations, most of which were on
the 'Fortune 500' list," followed suit. In 1978, it published its
recommendations for reform in The Role and Composition of the
Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation. It, too,
argued that the board had a monitoring role (although its re-
sponsibility extended beyond that role), and recommended
that the board be composed of a majority of outside directors
and that the audit and compensation committees be com-
posed entirely of outside directors.269
The monitoring board was also the subject of Melvin Ei-
senberg's The Structure of the Corporation, perhaps the most im-
portant work on corporate law since Berle and Means's The
Modern Corporation and Private Property. After surveying the
managing potential of the board of directors, Eisenberg con-
cluded that the modern board of directors could not perform
the tasks traditionally assigned to it. In fact, owner-managers
handled the affairs of closely held corporations while top exec-
utives managed those of the publicly held corporation. 270
266. The Guidebook was published in the fall of 1976 (Corporate Director's
Guidebook, 32 Bus. L. 5 (1976)) with a revised edition early in 1978 (Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. L. 1591 (1978)).
267. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 1976, supra note 266, at 31; see also Corpo-
rate Director's Guidebook, 1978, supra note 232, at 1619; Seligman, supra note
232, at 340.
268. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 1976, supra note 266, at 33-37; Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 1978, supra note 232, at 1622-27; Seligman, supra note
232, at 340. As Seligman further notes, "in 1978, the SEC required registered
firms to disclose additional information about the independence of their
directors, whether the firms had audit, nominating, and compensation com-
mittees, and whether an incumbent director had attended fewer than 75%
of a firm's board meetings during the past fiscal year." Id.
269. Seligman, supra note 232, at 341-42.
270. Eisenberg made this argument earlier. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal
Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and
Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 376 (1975). The references below are to
this earlier article.
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Closely looking at the things that boards actually did, Ei-
senberg concluded that the real task of boards of directors was
to hire and fire the CEO and to monitor the performance of
senior management. Informed by such observations, Eisen-
berg rejected calls for reform that focused on professional di-
rectors, full-time directors, or fully staffed boards of direc-
tors.27 1 Instead, his call for reform focused on the board's
monitoring functions. Eisenberg wanted to create "oversight
boards with adequate information to perform their task." 272
On its face, the independent monitoring board might
seem similar to the board that William 0. Douglas imagined
back in 1934. Like Douglas, Eisenberg, for example, wanted
the board to be independent of management and to be capa-
ble of acquiring adequate information to assess the executives'
actions. 273 But a significant conceptual difference separated
the two models. In the 1930s, directors were described as the
corporation's trustees, the shareholders' representatives, or
both; they had managerial, specifically consultative, as well as
monitoring roles. By the 1970s, the status of the board had
dramatically changed. For one thing, Eisenberg's analysis
stressed that the two preeminent roles of the board of direc-
tors were their selection and removal powers. "Under a moni-
toring model," he wrote, "the role of the board is to hold the
executives accountable for adequate results (whether finan-
cial, social, or both), while the role of the executives is to de-
termine how to achieve such results."274
By the early 1980s, academics, lawyers, and businessmen
of all political convictions agreed that the monitoring model
was appropriate for the board's role. The idea was reinforced
with the 1982 publication of the tentative draft of the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance (the final
version was adopted in 1992 after a decade-long heated de-
bate). But the monitoring model upon which agreement was
reached was very different from the one envisioned by Douglas
or even Eisenberg. Consensus was limited to the fact that inde-
pendent directors should play an important role in reviewing
the activities of the executives, and that such review should fo-
271. Id. at 385-90.
272. Id. at 391-403.
273. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 25-28.
274. Eisenberg, supra note 270, at 399.
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cus on financial results. What that meant as far as the duties
and liabilities of directors, and to whom directors owed them,
remained contested issues throughout the 1980s.
275
Take, for example, Eisenberg's model. Eisenberg stressed
that the monitoring model was not "mechanistic." While re-
sults mattered, monitoring did not end with results such as sat-
isfactory profits. As he explained, "The concept of monitoring
for results thus does not preclude the monitors from going
behind the result and either accepting as satisfactory a level of
performance which falls short of the applicable objective, or
criticizing as unsatisfactory a level of performance which ex-
ceeds it."' 2 7 6 The ABA saw matters differently. First, its Guide-
book stressed that directors who acted in accordance with the
Guidebook, "will not only be performing their directorial func-
tions competently, but will also be reducing the risk of being
charged with deficient individual performance as a direc-
tor."277 Moreover, as to the directors' scope of duties, the
Guidebook emphasized that the directors' duties were toward
the shareholders and shareholders only.278
Indeed, while some legal scholars wanted to use the moni-
toring model substantially to redefine the directors' duties,
corporate lawyers and business groups were strongly opposed
to any attempt to tinker with the very limited directorial du-
ties. Instead, they focused on the monitoring role of non-man-
agement directors and suggested that good boards "contain a
significant quota" of them. Moreover, as the business commu-
nity saw it, the monitoring board had one task-the directors'
role was "to monitor, in an environment of loyal but indepen-
dent oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the
corporation in behalf of those who invest in the corporation."
Directors were not to be representatives of different corporate
constituencies. 279 Indeed, according to the business commu-
nity and its lawyers, the directors' monitoring powers went
hand in hand with the ideal of share-price maximization. 280
275. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 29-56.
276. Eisenberg, supra note 270, at 399.
277. Corporate Director's Guidebook, 1978, supra note 266, at 1597; see also
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 1976, supra note 266, at 11.
278. Id.
279. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 30-34.
280. On the relationship between the monitoring board and share-price
maximization, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors'
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During the 1980s, the Delaware courts brought the busi-ness community's version of the monitoring model to bear
upon their analysis of directors' duties and the business judg-ment rule. Fully embracing the model as a structural ratherthan substantive one, the Delaware courts focused on the roleof the independent directors (independence narrowly definedas lack of control or domination by an individual interested in
the transaction). 281 If a majority of independent, disinterested
directors, following the courts' procedural requirements, ap-proved the board's actions (including conflict of interest trans-actions), the courts declared such actions to be shielded from
further judicial inquiry.282
Interestingly, as Mitchell explains, the true beneficiaries
of the Delaware courts' approach were the inside directors(management directors). 283 Take, again, the 1980s hostile
tender offers, the context in which the Delaware courts en-dorsed the monitoring model of the board. When a hostilebidder made an offer to the target corporation's shareholders,
the decision of the target corporation's directors to adopt adefensive tactic, on its face, was tainted with a conflict of inter-est because successful hostile bidders typically replaced the
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 555 (1984); Gordon,
supra note 9; Ira M. Millstein and Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Direc-
tors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REv.
1283, 1292-93 (1998).
281. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del. 1988). For an insightfulanalysis of "independence" under Delaware law, see Usha Rodrigues, The
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. OF CORP. L. 447 (2008). See also Alan R.
Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Indepen-
dence, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1351 (1989) (advocating a director's separate duty of
independence).
282. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (not-ing that when directors adopt a defensive tactic, their ability to fulfill their
Unocal duties is "materially enhanced... where... a majority of the boardfavoring the proposal consisted of outside independent directors who haveacted in accordance with the foregoing standards"); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-drews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (notingthat "certain presumptions ... generally attach to the decisions of a boardwhose majority consists of truly outside independent directors"); ParamountCommc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (noting thatthe evidence supporting the conclusion that in making its decision theTime's board was not uninformed "is materially enhanced by the fact thattwelve of Time's sixteen board members were outside independent direc-
tors.").
283. Mitchell, supra note 9, at 56-60.
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board. But, as Mitchell notes, "inside directors faced more seri-
ous conflicts than did outsiders. After all, the insiders derived
their livelihoods from their positions with the target corpora-
tions." 28 4 And while outsiders might lose "some prestige," their
"lucrative positions" were with their own corporations, corpo-
rations where they were insiders. 285 Given the potential con-
flict of interest, a decision by a board to engage in a defensive
tactic should have been analyzed under the fairness test as any
other form of self-dealing. But, beginning with Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware courts adopted a more leni-
ent test-a two prong test assessing, first, whether the directors
"had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corpo-
rate policy and effectiveness existed," and, second, whether
the defensive tactic the board adopted was "reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed."28 6 More important, the Delaware
courts emphasized that if a majority of the independent direc-
tors endorsed the defensive tactic, then the board's action
would likely meet the burden of the Unocal test.28 7 As Mitchell
concludes, the "cleansing effect" or "protective effect" of the
independent directors
allowed the courts to look not at the substance of the
actions but the procedures pursuant to which they
had been taken. Good process-decisionmaking by
reasonably informed, rational, independent boards-
allowed the courts entirely to bypass the substance of
the decisionmaking and even the substance of the
process of the decisionmaking. 288
In short, "[d] irectors serving on properly composed mon-
itoring boards behaving in accordance with the model were
almost exempt from liability. ' 28 9 As the following section ex-
plores, the Delaware courts went further. They collapsed the
duty of care into the business judgment rule and proclaimed,
without precedent to support their announcement, that the
284. Id. at 57.
285. Id.
286. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
287. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 282.
288. Mitchell, supra note 58, at 58.
289. Id. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20. Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. Cornu. L. 769 (2006) (arguing that Unocal
struck a careful balance between the board's authority and its accountabil-
ity).
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business judgment rule altered the standard of care from neg-ligence to gross negligence. If up to the 1980s directors might
have been held liable for violations of the duty of care (al-though they seldom were),2 90 by the end of the decade such
possibility was nonexistent.
D. The Business Judgment Rule and the Dormant Duty of Care
Up to the 1960s, the New York courts directed the formu-lation and development of the duty of care. As Justice Horsey
writes, "No Delaware court decision espouses the existence ofa director's fiduciary duty to act in an informed manner andwith the care of a prudent man until the decision of our sepa-rately constituted supreme court in 1963 in Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Manufacturing Co." 291
Graham was a derivative suit against the directors of Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. for damages caused to the corporation bythe non-director employees' and the corporation's violations
of antitrust regulations.29 2 Justice Wolcott of the Delaware Su-preme Court began his analysis by noting that, based on prece-
dent,
it appears that directors of a corporation in manag-
ing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
men would use in similar circumstances. Their duties
are those of control, and whether or not by neglect
they have made themselves liable for failure to exer-
290. As Horsey points out, before the 1980s, only in "a handful of cases
outside the context of financial institutions... directors of business corpora-tions had been found liable for breach of their duty of care." Horsey, supranote 19, at 978. For the most part, commentators agree that "the businessjudgment rule has historically proved to be 'a very potent defense for corpo-rate directors and officers against claims primarily asserted by shareholdersfor loss resulting from decisions that went awry."' Id. at 978-80.291. Id. at 982-83. See a/soJohnson, supra note 181, at 639 (noting thatGraham was the first Delaware case "explicitly [to] acknowledge" the duty ofcare). According to Johnson, Delaware lacked "a judicially articulated dutyof care until the 1960s." Hence, "Delaware's law on the business judgmentrule developed before that time with no explicit connection to that vital
duty." Id. at 625.292. These employees and the corporation entered guilty pleas to the an-titrust indictments. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del.
1963).
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cise proper control depends on the circumstances
and facts of the particular case.29 3
As discussed above, courts had endorsed the standard of
the prudent person at least since the early twentieth century.
294 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Delaware courts con-
tinued to suggest that the standard by which violations of the
duty of care would be evaluated was the ordinary negligence
standard endorsed in Graham. But Graham, a case involving di-
rectorial inaction, did not address the question of the business
judgment rule as no business decision was made. Interestingly,
while they neglected to develop the doctrinal precepts of the
duty of care, at the time that Graham was decided, the Dela-
ware courts had already developed a "'business judgment' ju-
risprudence" independent of that duty.29 5 As I argue below,
after Graham, as the Delaware courts attempted to define the
relationship between their developed business judgment rule
and their underdeveloped duty-of-care jurisprudence, they lay
the foundation for the obliteration of the latter.296
293. Id. at 130.
294. Interestingly, just as it endorsed this standard of care, Graham added
an exception to directors' liability. Citing to the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Briggs (1891) (discussed in Part II.B. above), Wolcott proclaimed that
directors "are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordi-
nates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is
wrong.... [A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdo-
ing which they have no reason to suspect exists." Id. Just as monitoring was
becoming the board's only task, the court limited the directors' liability for
performing it.
295. Johnson, supra note 181, at 639. See alsoA. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Sympo-
sium: Southeastern Conference on Corporate and Securities Law: II. Fiduciary Obliga-
tions in the Corporate Boardroom: Recent Developments in Substantive Business Judg-
ment Rule, 61 N.C.L. Rev 534, 534 (1983) (arguing that "[A] great deal of the
development of the business judgment rule occurred from the turn of the
century through the 1940s and 1950s" and then again in the 1980s. Accord-
ing to Sparks, "During the 1960s and the early part of the 1970s, the federal
securities laws were at their apogee, and most of the scholarly writing and
many of the case decisions focused on the expanding scope of rule lOb-5,
which before Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green was thought by many to be
subsuming much of the state law covering the business judgment rule. Only
after the Santa Fe decision in 1977, which reemphasized the role of state law,
did there appear to be a renewed interest in the business judgment rule.").
296. See alsoJohnson, supra note 181, at 642-43 (noting that in the last two
decades of the twentieth century, the Delaware courts shrank the duty of
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As late as the 1970s, the business judgment rule in Dela-
ware seemed to be grounded in deference to the directors'
expert knowledge. 297 Take, for example Chasin v. Gluck, a caseinvolving an action by a shareholder of a subsidiary against thesubsidiary's directors for failing to demand that the parent cor-poration make timely payments of amounts due to the subsidi-ary. The Delaware Chancery Court held that when a directorwas in a position freely to exercise independent business judg-ment, he would not be held liable absent "bad faith, negli-gence, or gross abuse of discretion." 298 But, as this quote alsosuggests, to benefit from the presumption of expertise, direc-tors had to exercise reasonable diligence and care. As S. Sa-muel Arsht concluded in his well-known article The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited:
the term "business judgment rule" and the presump-
tion that often identifies it mean simply that a stock-
holder who challenges a nonself-dealing transaction
must persuade the court that the corporation's direc-tors, officers, or controlling stockholders in authoriz-
ing the transaction did not act in good faith, did notact in a manner they reasonably believed to be in the
corporation's best interest, or did not exercise thecare an ordinarily prudent person in a like positionwould use under similar circumstances. 299
Things changed dramatically in the 1980s, a decade inwhich, as already noted, numerous corporations faced hostiletakeovers. Seeking to protect the directors' discretion to say no
care to the duty to be informed, a requirement they derived from their de-veloped business judgment rule doctrine).
297. The same seemed to be true in New York. Take, for example, Kamin
v. American Express Co., a case that embraced a rather all-encompassing busi-
nessjudgment rule. While noting that courts would not interfere with direc-
tors' actions "unless the powers have been illegally or unconscientiously exe-cuted or unless it be made to appear that the acts were fraudulent or collu-sive and destructive of the rights of the stockholders," the Supreme Court ofNew York, Special Term, also described the business judgment rule as a rule
of deference. As the court put it, "mere errors ofjudgment [were] not suffi-cient as grounds for equity interference for the powers of those entrustedwith corporate management are largely discretionary." Kamin v. American
Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 810 (1976).
298. Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (1971). For a detailed discussion
of Chasin and other cases, see Arsht, supra note 20, at 102-11.
299. Arsht, supra note 20, at 134.
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to hostile bidders, the Delaware courts turned their attention,
generally, to the business judgment rule and its relationship to
the duty of care. 300 Aronson v. Lewis, a case involving the ques-
tion of demand futility, addressed this issue. 30 1 Having deter-
mined that "demand can only be excused where facts are al-
leged with particularity which creates a reasonable doubt that
the directors' action was entitled to the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule,"302 the Delaware Supreme Court went on
to define the meaning of the business judgment rule. It did so
as a way of offering instructions to the lower courts as to how
to assess this particular case and others. The court began by
noting that:
the business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of
the managerial prerogatives of Delaware direc-
tors.... It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judg-
ment will be respected by the courts. The burden is
on the party challenging the decision to establish
facts rebutting the presumption.3 0 3
Having anchored the business judgment rule in "manage-
rial prerogative" (in line with the mid century deference to
directors' expert opinion) and emphasized that only disinter-
ested directors could claim the protection of the rule (also in
accordance to precedent), the Delaware Supreme Court went
further. First, the court stressed that "to invoke the rule's pro-
tection directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to
300. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON, AND STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS 3 (2nd ed. 1988) (noting that the 1980s have "seen the business
judgment rule become the center of rapid development and controversy in
the corporate world as the courts struggle to adapt the rule to transactions
involving corporate control and the termination of shareholder litigation by
special board committees."). Even Smith v. Van Gorkom, which held directors
liable for breach of the duty of care in a friendly takeover situation, seemed
to support the conclusion that the court was attempting to empower incum-
bent directors to say no to bidders. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 138-39 (1988).
301. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
302. Id. at 808.
303. Id. at 812.
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making a business decision, of all material information reason-
ably available to them. Having become so informed, they must
then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties."
304 Moreover, the court went on to announce that "while the
Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable
standard of care, our analysis satisfies us that under the busi-
ness judgment rule director liability is predicated upon con-
cepts of gross negligence. '30 5
As Lyman Johnson has pointed out, the "informed" ele-
ment was not part of the business judgment rule doctrine until
Aronson introduced it. In adding it, Aronson lay the foundation
for the ultimate equation of the duty of care with the duty to
be informed. 30 6 Precedent also did not support the court's
conclusion that gross negligence was the standard of care ap-
plicable to directors. As Arsht's review of Delaware cases a few
years before Aronson was decided revealed, most of the cases
cited in Aronson dealt with "parent-subsidiary transactions
where a determination of fairness is meaningless or impossi-
ble." 307 In these situations, the courts had "characterized the
standard of 'gross and palpable overreaching' as a 'business
judgment' test. '308 But, as Arsht demonstrated, this was not a
generally applicable test. 309 Other cases cited in Aronson sim-
ply stated that the court would not interfere with the board's
judgment absent evidence of fraud or gross abuse of discre-
304. Id.
305. Id. See alsoJohnson, supra note 181, at 643 n.81 (noting that this sen-
tence captured "Aronson's functional conflating of the duty of care and the
business judgment rule.").
306. Johnson, supra note 181, at 641-42. According to Johnson, Aronson
changed the traditional presumption that directors acted "in good faith, in
the exercise of their best judgment, for what they believed to be the advan-
tage of the corporation and all its stockholders" into a presumption that "in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was
in the best interests of the company." Id. at 640. For the traditional formula-
tion of the rule see, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp. 140 A. 264, 268
(Del. 1927).
307. Arsht, supra note 20, at 102.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 102-7 (discussing Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 246 A.2d
789, 793 (Del. 1967), Getty Oil. Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del.
1970), and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
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tion.310 One case suggested that directors might be liable for
gross negligence, but did not negate the possibility of liability
for negligence. 311 Even the Delaware Supreme Court admit-
ted that "the Delaware cases have not been precise in articulat-
ing the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is
governed." 312 Nonetheless it chose to characterize the cases as
"hold[ing] that director liability is predicated on a standard
which is less exacting than simple negligence. 313
Aronson v. Lewis radically changed the contours of the bus-
iness judgment rule and duty of care. A year later, in Smith v.
Van Gorkom, the case that shocked the business and legal com-
munities by finding directors liable for breach of the duty of
care, the Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed its own proc-
lamation in Aronson that "under the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negli-
gence." 314 Moreover, the court in Van Gorkom concluded that
"the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard
for determining whether a business judgment reached by a
board of directors was an informed one.''315 Unless a plaintiff
arguing a breach of the duty of care demonstrated that the
directors were grossly negligent (that is, grossly negligent with
respect to the requirement to be informed), the directors
would have the presumption of the business judgment rule
and the court would not second-guess their actions. 31 6 In
short, a rule that originated in an understanding of human
fallibility, and transformed into a rule of deference to expert
opinion, had become, by century's end, a defense precluding
judicial inquiry into the directors' challenged actions. 3 17
310. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966); Moskowitz v.
Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 140
(1960).
311. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. 1972).
312. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
313. Id. Commentators also disagreed about the standard of care that dif-
ferent cases endorsed. Veasey and Manning, supra note 3, at 926-28.
314. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (1985).
315. Id. Interestingly, what "gross negligence" meant remained an open
question. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (1986).
316. For the endorsement of similar language in other jurisdictions, see
BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 300, at 9-10.
317. See Arsht, supra note 20, at 100 ("[T]he business judgment rule was
not conceived as a defense that, once asserted, precluded judicial inquiry
into the procedures and methodologies followed by the directors in making
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Conceptually, the new vision of the business judgment
rule was the logical result of treating directors as agents. While
the idea that directors were representatives of the sharehold-
ers correlated well with a rule of deference to their expert
judgment, the notion that directors were agents undermined
such deference. As agents, directors could not be presumed to
be experts. They could only be described as performing the
tasks assigned to them by their principals, the shareholders. In
such context, the business judgment rule could only be a
means of protecting directors from their principals when the
latter challenge how the task was performed; it could only be a
rule shielding directors from liability.
Ironically, perhaps, it was not Van Gorkom's formulation of
the business judgment rule but rather its holding directors lia-
ble for breach of the duty of care that took the legal and busi-
ness communities entirely by surprise. And the Delaware legis-
lature was quick to respond. Within months it enacted section
102(b) (7), allowing corporations to include in their charters
provisions that limit, or even eliminate, the personal liability of
directors for almost all breaches of the duty of care. Other ju-
risdictions followed SUit.3 18
But, as became clear within a decade after Van Gorkom was
decided, the concerns that led to the enactment of such excul-
patory provisions were overdrawn. Within a few years, the Del-
aware courts, using Aronson as their precedent, reduced the
duty of care to a bare minimum. Not only was the bar of gross
negligence hard to meet, the courts also shrank the duty of
care to the requirement that directors be informed, a duty
they could easily fulfill by following the script provided in Van
Gorkom.3 19
Cede v. Technicolor, in which the plaintiff shareholder ar-
gued that the Technicolor directors breached their duty of
care in entering a merger agreement, illustrates this point. In
their challenged decision." Rather "the businessjudgment rule was a starting
point for inquiry into the directors' decisionmaking process.").
318. See MARK A. SARGENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D & 0 LIABLTY HAND-
BOOK (Thompson West ed., 2008) (discussing other jurisdictions that
adopted similar provisions).
319. Johnson, supra note 181, at 633. See also Emerald Partners v. Berlin,
787 A.2d 85, 91 (2001) ("The statutory enactment of section 102(b) (7) was a
logical corollary to the common law principles of the business judgment
rule.").
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its analysis of the duty of care, the Delaware Supreme Court
brought together the different aspects of Delaware's late twen-
tieth century approach. First, the court noted that "[t]he ele-
ments, formulation and application of the Delaware business
judgment rule follow from the premise that shareholders of a
public corporation delegate to their board of directors respon-
sibility for managing the business enterprise. '320 In other
words, in its final (liability shielding) reiteration, the business
judgment rule was derived from the idea that directors were
agents of the shareholders. Second, the court noted that only
disinterested directors "who have both adequately informed
themselves before voting on the business transaction at hand
and acted with the requisite care" could invoke the rule.32 1
Then, lest it be misunderstood, the court described the
relationship between the requirement that directors be in-
formed and the duty of care. "The duty of the directors of a
company to act on an informed basis," the court explained,
"forms the duty of care element of the business judgment
rule. '3 22 As to the standard applicable to the duty to be in-
formed (now equated with the duty of care), the court, follow-
ing Aronson, adopted the gross negligence standard.
If anything was left of the judicially developed duty of care
after Cede, Chancellor Allen's contemporaneous decision in In
re Caremark, Int'l Inc. Derivative Litigation made obvious its irrel-
evance:
What should be understood, but may not widely be
understood by courts or commentators who are not
often required to face such questions, is that compli-
ance with a director's duty of care can never appro-
priately be judicially determined by reference to the
320. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
321. Id.
322. Id. See also Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care,
24 DEL.J. CORP. L. 787, 803-5 (1999) (discussing the duty of care in Cede). As
Johnson points out, Cede's conflation of the duty of care and business judg-
ment rule, and the courts' reduction of both to the duty to be informed,
shrank the duty of care almost to nothing. Id. See also Johnson, supra note
181, at 633 ("Cede's analytical framework creates confusion, first, by seeming
to forget that the duty of care and the business judgment rule, although
complementary, are two distinct legal concepts serving different roles. Sec-
ond, by treating the rule as an all-purpose metric for gauging director liabil-
ity, Cede devalues the duty of care.").
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content of the board decision that leads to a corporate
loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or
rationality of the process employed. That is, whether
a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact,
believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of
wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or
"irrational", provides no ground for director liability,
so long as the court determines that the process em-
ployed was either rational or employed in a good faith
effort to advance corporate interests. To employ a
different rule-one that permitted an "objective"
evaluation of the decision-would expose directors
to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges
or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious
to investor interests. Thus, the business judgment
rule is process oriented and informed by a deep re-
spect for all good faith board decisions. 323
Allen's reintroduction of good faith was an attempt, per-
haps, to resurrect aspects of the duty of care for which direc-
tors might be held personally liable after section 102(b) (7)
and Cede. Allen declared that the business judgment rule
would protect decisions that were "the product of a process"
that was either rational or "deliberately considered in good
faith. '3 24 He went further to argue that, with respect to their
monitoring obligations, directors had a duty to "exercise a
good faith judgment that the corporation's informationand re-
porting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the
board that appropriate information will come to its attention
in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that
it may satisfy its responsibility. '325
323. In re Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
324. Id. at 967.
325. Id. at 970. See also Sarah Helene Duggin and Stephen M. Goldman,
Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good
Faith, 56 Am. U.L. REV. 211, 232-37 (2006) (discussing the emergence of
good faith after the enactment of §102(b)(7)); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring
Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 719 (2007) (discussing Caremark's
contribution to the development of the good faith standard). For an innova-
tive analysis of the benefits of the business judgment's rule emphasis on pro-
cess, see Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral De-
fense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U.L. REv.
675 (2002).
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In a footnote, Allen put the duty of care to sleep. "The
vocabulary of negligence while often employed," he noted, cit-
ing to Aronson, "is not well-suited to judicial review of board
attentiveness," especially, albeit not only, if such usage implies
looking at the substance of the decision "as any evidence of
possible 'negligence.' ' ' 326 A standard of care no longer at-
tached to the directors' duty of care. As long as directors, in-
siders and outsiders alike, follow the scripts that the Delaware
courts had provided them throughout the 1980s, the Delaware
courts would not reevaluate their decisions.
EPILOGUE
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the
opinion that the concept of intentional dereliction of
duty, a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is an
appropriate (although not the only) standard for de-
termining whether fiduciaries have acted in good
faith. Deliberate indifference and inaction in the face
of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly
disloyal to the corporation. It is the epitome of faith-
less conduct.3 27
Having introduced, or reintroduced, the concept of good
faith as a means of resurrecting the dormant duty of care, the
Delaware courts were faced with the challenge of defining the
duty to act in good faith. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litiga-
tion offered a golden opportunity to address the matter. The
key question in the case was whether Disney's board of direc-
tors breached their duties by hiring Michael Ovitz as president
and firing him fourteen months later with a severance package
of roughly $130 million. Earlier in the litigation, the court dis-
missed the duty of loyalty claims. At the same time, Disney's
charter exempted directors from liability for breach of the
duty of care (pursuant to section 102(b) (7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law). Hence, resurrecting a separate
good faith standard was the only means of imposing liability
on the board of directors. Chancellor Chandler was skillful in
crafting such standard (although, ultimately, without imposing
liability in the case before him), and the Delaware Supreme
326. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
327. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005).
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Court affirmed. According to Disney, a director might fail to
act in good faith if he or she "intentionally acts with a purpose
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corpora-
tion," "acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law,"
or "intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties." 328 The
latter possibility was particularly pertinent in Disney, but the
court, even if reluctantly, determined that the Disney directors
did not fail to fulfill their duty of good faith. 329
Developments past Disney seem to have undermined the
potential force of its good faith analysis. 330 For my argument
in this article, however, Disney remains crucially important for
a different reason-for Chandler's candid comments about the
state of directors' duties and liabilities at the turn of the
twenty-first century. Chandler began his analysis with the fol-
lowing apology:
Unlike ideals of corporate governance, a fiduciary's duties
do not change over time. How we understand those duties may
evolve and become refined, but the duties themselves have not
changed, except to the extent that fulfilling a fiduciary duty
requires obedience to other positive law. This court strongly
encourages directors and officers to employ best practices, as
those practices are understood at the time a corporate deci-
sion is taken. But Delaware law does not-indeed, the com-
mon law cannot-hold fiduciaries liable for a failure to com-
ply with the aspirational ideal of best practices .... -331
As this article has explored, the directors' role, status, and
fiduciary obligations have dramatically changed over time. In
the course of one century, directors have turned from trustees
328. Id. at 755, affd, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
329. Id.
330. In 2006, in Stone v. Ritter, a case in which shareholders charged direc-
tors with failure to exercise oversight, the Delaware Supreme Court ad-
dressed an important question that Disney left open-"whether a violation of
the duty to act in good faith is a basis for the direct imposition of liability."
Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 363, 369 (2006).
The court answered this question in the negative. As the court saw it, the
duty to act in good faith was not an independent duty, on the same footing
as the duty of care and duty of loyalty. Accordingly, only the duty of care and
duty of loyalty, "where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a fail-
ure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly." Id. at 370. Failure to act in
good faith was subsumed under the duty of loyalty.
331. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 697.
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for the community to representatives of the shareholders to
agents whose obligations and liabilities have been so limited
that all that is left for the court to do in cases involving allega-
tions of breaches of fiduciary duties is to dismiss the suit. No
longer the subject of "the punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive," directors are expected to use "the morals of the market
place" as their guideline.33 2 The Delaware courts began their
ascendance as the voice of corporate law only in the last de-
cades of the century. But their alteration of the directors' du-
ties was swift and effective. Having eradicated any concept of
trust or even representation to bind directors to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, all that the Delaware courts have left
to elaborate are ideals they are unwilling to enforce.
332. Mendes Hershman, Opening Remarks, 27 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1972) (citing
Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928)).
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